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Beyond Zero-Sum
Environmentalism
by Shalanda Baker, Robin Kundis
Craig, John Dernbach, Keith Hirokawa,
Sarah Krakoff, Jessica Owley, Melissa
Powers, Shannon Roesler, Jonathan
Rosenbloom, J.B. Ruhl, Jim Salzman,
Inara Scott, and David Takacs

Summary
Environmental law and environmental protection are
often portrayed as requiring trade offs: “jobs versus
environment,” “markets versus regulation,” “enforcement versus incentives.” In the summer of 2016, members of the Environmental Law Collaborative gathered
to consider how environmentalism and environmental regulation can advance beyond this framing to
include new constituents and offer new pathways to
tackle the many significant challenges ahead. Months
later, the initial activities of the Trump Administration highlighted the use of zero-sum rhetoric, with the
appointment of government officials and the issuance
of executive orders that indeed seem to view environmental issues as in a zero-sum relationship with jobs
or economic progress. In the essays below, the authors
explore the meaning and the role of zero-sum environmentalism as a first step in moving beyond it.
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I.

What We Talk About When We Talk
About Zero-Sum Environmentalism

This section was authored by Jessica Owley, Professor, SUNY
Buffalo Law School.
In the summer of 2016, a small but hardy group of law professors gathered to discuss the concept of zero-sum environmentalism. We had set for our agenda to get “beyond”
zero-sum environmentalism. The suggestion was that there
is a dominant approach to environmental law issues that
frames them as zero-sum and that this framing can be
damaging to environmental progress. What we grappled
with, though, is whether environmental problems really are
(at least at times) zero-sum. Is the description of an environmental issue as zero-sum ever accurate? Are laws treating issues as zero-sum when they should not be doing so?
Or maybe ignoring a zero-sum framework that is at play?
Perhaps there are no zero-sum dynamics in the real
world and instead “zero-sum” is just the language we
(or some of us) use to describe environmental trade offs.
Zero-sum as used in the context of environmental policy
implies stark winners and losers. If the environment wins,
the economy must lose. To protect the owls, we destroy
the lives of the loggers. To prevent global climate change,
Americans must completely change life as they know it.
Indeed, the concept, if not language, of zero-sum appears
particularly prevalent in the new Donald Trump Administration, where actions in favor of environmental protection
are couched as actions against the economy.
Our discussions revealed (unsurprisingly) that we all
came to this question with different examples, assumpAuthors’ Note: The authors collectively engaged in this work as part
of the Environmental Law Collaborative (ELC). This project would
not have been possible without generous support from the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and the Baldy Center for Law
and Social Policy at the University at Buffalo. The Collaborative was
also enriched by Holly Doremus and Stephen Miller who, while they
were unable to join in writing essays, both attended and contributed
to the discussion. ELC thanks ELI for its continual support of our
efforts. ELC’s first collection of essays appeared in the Environmental
Law Reporter (ELR) four years ago. [See Michael Burger et al.,
Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change Challenge,
43 ELR 10342 (Apr. 2013)]. The group expanded these essays into
a book-length project. [Rethinking Sustainability to Meet
the Climate Change Challenge (Jessica Owley & Keith
Hirokawa eds. 2015)]. The second collection of essays appeared in
ELR in 2015. [Sarah Adams-Schoen et al., A Response to the IPCC
Fifth Assessment, 45 ELR 10027 (Jan. 2015)], with a following
book [Contemporary Issues in Climate Change Law and
Policy: Essays Inspired by the IPCC (Robin Kundis Craig &
Stephen R. Miller eds., 2016)].
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Figure 1: Ngram of “Zero-Sum”
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tions, and solutions. Some people rejected the idea that
zero-sum problems ever actually exist, and suggested that
reliance on the framework and use of the term can be damaging to environmental governance—not just because it is
an overly constrained view of how trade offs actually work,
but also because the language of zero-sum necessarily creates a combative stance that can impede collaboration and
creative thinking. Others suggested that for some environmental concerns, the zero-sum framework was underused.
That is, we might reach better results if we confront the
actual trade offs. What work does it do to label environmental problems as a zero-sum game? In this case, climate
change and biodiversity protection serve as key examples.
Maybe we do need to emphasize that you cannot have your
cake and eat it too. Building that hospital will indeed lead
to the extinction of a species. Putting the conundrum in
stark terms might help highlight the need for embracing
the principle of in dubio pro natura1 (when in doubt act in
favor of nature).
Most of us agreed, however, that when we see the zerosum rhetoric or when we use it ourselves, we are not really
talking the language of economists.2 We are taking their
term and simplifying it (taking a complex topic from
another discipline and simplifying it for our use is something we legal academics are good at).3 But more than that,
1.	

Josefina Russo & Ricardo Russo, In Dubio Pro Natura: Un Principio de
Precaución y Prevención a Favor de los Recursos Naturales, 5 Tierra Tropical
1659 (2009).
2.	 See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & and Susan Skeath, Games of Strategy:
Fourth International Student Edition 225 (2015) (describing basic
principles of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games in economics).
3.	 Or perhaps not that good at. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship
Today, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1326 (2002) (“Remarkable, too, is the
insouciance with which they discuss concepts from other fields, such as
political science, with nary a reference to the scholarly literature in those
fields.”). See also Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4
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we realized that we are not the ones using this term. In
fact, it is not heavily used in the legal academy. It is used in
the media, though, and by politicians.
Figure 1, above, (created by Google’s Ngram function)
shows an increased use of the phrase “zero-sum” in books
first appearing around 1940 and increasingly used since
then, with a tapering off beginning in 2000. However,
overall, there is not a high frequency of use of the phrase.
And “zero-sum environmentalism” did not appear often
enough to be plotted with Google’s Ngram function.4
Following this train of thought, maybe the mission of
going beyond zero-sum environmentalism is to reject the
use of the term—to emphasize that it is not really occurring. Or maybe it is to show the strength of the attitude of
zero-sum. If we think that a zero-sum approach is flawed
as overly simplistic, then highlighting where actors/policymakers are treating complex environmental problems as
zero-sum issues can reveal flaws in policymaking. Daylighting the zero-sum framework can expose overly simplified
approaches to environmental protection efforts, allowing
one to target those arenas as needing richer analyses.
Once I began looking for it, I saw zero-sum issues
throughout my work. For example, I have often complained
about the nature of property law arrangements (specifically
conservation easements) to break instead of bend.5 That is,
Yale J.L. & Human. 79, 79-80 (1992) (suggesting that often legal academics
incorporate other disciplines in a “sub-standard” or “superficial” way).
4.	 See Google Books, Ngram Viewer, https://books.google.com/ngrams
(last visited Mar. 3, 2017). What would be more interesting is to chart this
phrase in speeches, academic publications, and news articles, but Google has
yet to make such an Ngram (at least not one that is publicly available), and
searching through such piles of documents is beyond the task of this essay.
5.	 See, e.g., Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the Climate Change
Crossroads, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 199 (2011); Jessica Owley, Property
Constructs and Nature’s Challenge to Perpetuity, in Environmental Law and
Contrasting Ideas of Nature: A Constructivist Approach 64 (Keith
Hirokawa ed. 2014).
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when something starts to go wrong, making it challenging
or impossible to comply with a conservation easement, the
legal solution from a property law standpoint is to terminate the agreement instead of amending it. Thus, either we
have the conservation easement in place or we do not.
You can think about this as arising in other disputes
over property as well. Despite the tales of King Solomon,6
property law does not actually split the baby or often
divide up property. Instead, it is commonly an all-or-nothing approach where one person is declared a winner and
another the loser. Someone gets mom’s house; we do not
really draw a line down the middle and force the squabbling sisters to share it (although I think there are probably
multiple movies with that story line . . . if not, I call dibs).
Suggesting that the all-or-nothing approach does not
need to be the solution for conservation lands, Nancy
McLaughlin has successfully argued (and convinced many
conservationists and courts) that we should go beyond
property law and import charitable trust principles into
conservation easement law to enable changes to conservation easements that are more likely to foster greater land
protection.7 Even judges are willing to deviate from the
zero-sum approach, as we see with Judge Kevin McCarthy
in the famous dispute over Barry Bonds’ 73rd home-run
baseball, who decided to split the value of the ball rather
than award it to one of the parties claiming to have caught
it8 —as would have been the more traditional property law
approach.9 As these examples show, deviations from the
zero-sum approach may be increasing in acceptance even
in the strict context of property law.
Maybe the problem is not that we need to rethink and
find alternatives to the zero-sum approach, but indeed to
realize that we never should have framed the problems as
zero-sum in the first place. Perhaps labeling things like
land conservation as a zero-sum game was reductive from
the start (problems are decidedly more complicated than
Solomon’s baby-splitting approach suggests). In land conservation, for example, we do not simply decide that land is
to be set aside for pure conservation in a reserve-like setting
or to be actively exploited to generate wealth. Instead, the
potential arrangements and uses of the land are numerous.
Indeed, we can often both protect environmental features
and promote economic returns for the landowners.
Zero-sum analyses in the economic sense are usually
modeled as a two-player game.10 Our land conservation
example, however, shows us that it is too simplistic to
look at environmental problems that way. It is not simply
“Environment” as player one and “People” as player two.
A myriad of players and arrangements can be benefited
6.	
7.	

1 Kings 30.
See Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and
Beyond, 34 Ecology L.Q. 673 (2007). See also Kolb v. City of Storm
Lake, 736 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 2007) (applying the cy pres doctrine to a
conservation easement).
8.	 Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2002).
9.	 See, e.g., Zachary D. Kuperman, Cutting the Baby in Half: An Economic
Critique of Indivisible Resource Partition, 77 Brook. L. Rev. 263 (2011).
10. See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 2, at 225.
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and harmed by choices in land conservation arrangements.
Other environmental issues are no less complicated.
The label of “zero-sum” should probably be setting off
alarm bells for us. Indeed, we might want to keep close tabs
for use of the phrase in environmental contexts. Each time
we see policymakers using the terms, it should be a signal
to us. Tracking “zero-sum environmentalism” might help
highlight a flaw in the system. Whether we reject the framing or embrace it, we all agree that deeper investigation
into how policymakers and academics approach environmental concerns can improve outcomes.

II.

Seeing Past the Zero-Sum Game in
Environmental Policy—Harder Than
It Looks

This section was authored by J.B. Ruhl, David Daniels Allen
Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Program on Law and
Innovation, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment and
Land Use Program, Vanderbilt University.
In Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, Robert Wright
offers a sweeping view of human evolution that culminates in his argument that modern society has become so
complex and interconnected that there are no true “zerosum” games to be played between people or institutions.11
Economists and game theorists use the zero-sum game
concept to describe a situation in which each participant’s
gain (or loss) of utility is exactly balanced by the losses (or
gains) of the utility of the other participant(s). A zero-sum
game is not necessarily a bad situation—in fact, it is what
economists argue markets and trading should produce.
The reason is that if the situation is nonzero-sum, then, by
definition, one participant can gain by more than another
loses, or even both can gain. That is why sellers sell products and consumers buy them! The market depends on
traders to identify nonzero-sum situations and trade away
until they reach zero-sum, which is what economists refer
to as Pareto optimality.
Being in a zero-sum game can be a sticky situation, however, if there is some reason why redistribution of the pie is
necessary. If it were just up to the participants in a zero-sum
game, and assuming they are what economists describe as
“rational economic actors,” they would not agree to redistribute the pie unless someone (irrationally) volunteers to
be made worse off to make someone else better off. But it is
not always up to just the participants. Sometimes government, in pursuit of a desired social policy, intervenes to
force a “trade” that at least some of the participants would
not voluntarily (rationally) make.
If Wright’s thesis is right, however, government ought to
be able to intervene on behalf of social policy without concern about unsettling participants in zero-sum situations,
because most social contexts really operate as nonzero-sum
11. Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (Reprint ed.
2001).
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dynamics. Indeed, this is an expressed or implied premise
of much of environmental policy, the idea being that net
social welfare is increased—the pie only gets bigger—as we
protect the environment to protect ourselves. Many environmental protection advocates eschew talking about policy in these crass economic terms, preferring to emphasize
the intrinsic value of nature, social justice, and other nonmarket justifications for making people change behavior to
improve environmental conditions. But the bottom line is
that much of environmental policy rests on the promise of
improving the greater good by leveraging the ubiquitous
presence of nonzero-sumness.
Take water allocation as an example. If environmental policy moves in the direction of conserving aquatic
resources, government might intervene to force farmers
using water from a river to reduce diversions and let more
water go downstream to, say, an estuary. The key here is
that the government does not pay fair market value for the
water—the reduced diversion is required by regulation,
such as under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). On the
surface, this looks like a zero-sum game—every additional
gallon going downstream is one less gallon for the farmers,
and they are not compensated for their loss. But wait! The
increase in water into the estuary improves conditions for
a fishery; the fishing and tourism industries thrive; more
people can buy the farmers’ crops; the farmers can buy less
expensive fish; and so on. Everything is interconnected, so
nothing is a zero-sum game.
Try telling that to the farmers. The problem with
Wright’s thesis, and with using it to justify environmental
policy, is that it turns back on itself. There is no question
that social-ecological systems (SESs) are highly complex and interconnected, making true zero-sum games
hard to find. But the sheer complexity of massive SESs is
what also makes it excruciatingly difficult to connect all
the dots of the nonzero-sum game within the SES. At a
macro scale, nonzero-sum rules; at the micro scale of the
farmer seeing more water go by the farm in the river, it
looks like zero-sum.
One of the major obstacles environmental policy has had
in gaining broader and lasting legitimacy is the difficulty of
convincing participants who believe they are in zero-sum
games and being unfairly treated by environmental regulation that they are in fact in nonzero-sum games, and are
going to be fine. Appeals to the intrinsic value of nature do
not get very far with most people who feel rammed into
such “loser” situations. Indeed, the perception that one or
one’s community is stuck in an “I/we lose, they win” zerosum situation can be so strong that social psychologists
refer to it as the zero-sum mentality. And there are many
factors at play making it difficult for those “afflicted” with
this condition to see past the perceived zero-sum game to
find the win-win zen of nonzero-sumness.
First, there is the problem of mixed metrics that the participants in the situation are using to assess their positions.
For example, in the water allocation scenario, the farmers
value gallons of water for crops, the environmental interests
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value gallons of water for their ecological effect, and other
interests value them for other reasons. Counting gallons
of water does not get at what groups in the system really
value, but it is the easiest metric to count. In a market trading context, so long as each trader knows the value it places
on the water, trades will occur until zero-sum equilibrium
is met. But in a regulatory context, government is acting as the “market,” assigning the values, and forcing the
“trades.” The various interests thus are more likely to contest the government’s assigned values than they would were
the reallocation taking place in the market through voluntary trades. The result is that gallons of water becomes the
default metric, which makes it difficult for the farmers to
see anything but a one-for-one reallocation from them to
the other interests—a zero-sum game.
Another obscuring factor is the multi-scalar nature
of SESs. The appeal to nonzero-sumness often involves
looking at the macro-scale dynamics and evaluating systemwide impacts of a change in allocation of resources,
such as through cost-benefit analysis, to demonstrate
net gain in social welfare. But many actors in the SES
understandably focus on scales most relevant to their wellbeing, which often are micro-scale in scope. It is at these
micro scales that the reallocation begins to look more like
zero-sum, as with the farmers in the water reallocation
scenario. In short, proving that the macro scale operates
in nonzero-sum dynamics does not mean there are no
dynamics at smaller scales that come much closer to zerosum. Expecting the “losers” in those small-scale contexts
to think big-picture is a big ask, particularly when it takes
teams of ecologists and economists to describe the macroscale SES dynamics.
There is also the temporal transition dimension to consider. When game theorists study zero-sum game trading
behavior, the trades are usually immediate between the
traders. In the real world—particularly the world of environmental policy—the trades tend to stretch out over time.
Climate change presents this problem in spades, where
most of the “losers” bearing the cost of regulation are in
the present and most of the “winners” benefitting from the
regulation are in the future. The “green jobs” argument for
shifting to renewable energy also has this dimension, as
the “war on coal” rhetoric frames the dynamic as one community losing jobs in the present to make jobs for others
in the future. Even the water reallocation scenario presents
this problem, however, as the rehabilitation of the aquatic
resources and the wonderful benefits that will flow from it
could take decades to materialize to the point of sending
benefits back to the farmers—by which time the farmers
that gave up the water and bore that cost may no longer be
on the scene.
Both the multi-scalar and temporal transition problems are exacerbated by the distribution of costs and benefits leading to what is often an imbalance in magnitude
between the costs borne and the benefits received by the
“losers.” Even if the farmers in the water allocation scenario
grow to accept that the nonzero-sumness operates at the
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macro-scale, plays out over time, and produces net aggregate social benefit, their particular cost-benefit ledger looks
like a bad deal. They bear most of the cost of the water reallocation, but share in the benefits with the rest of the SES
community in a diffuse distribution. This problem plagues
the ESA, where protection of species often affects specific
communities while the claimed benefits of biodiversity are
far more diffusely enjoyed.
Even getting a handle on these problems does not necessarily avoid the problem of imprecise valuation. The claim
that the water reallocation is a nonzero-sum dynamic can
be argued coherently as an ecological, economic, and sociological proposition, but proving it in dollars and cents is a
far different matter. In short, we do not have the methods
to do it reliably. Biodiversity is great, but how much is it
worth? This problem has stymied the integration of ecosystem services concepts into policy decisionmaking—we
know that ecosystems provide valuable nonmarket services
such as water filtration by riparian habitat, but putting a
value on them is quite difficult, particularly at the small
scales where one group perceives a zero-sum dynamic with
them as the “losers.”
Lastly, the polarizing effect of government intervention
often complicates environmental policy by immediately
and tangibly dividing groups into us-versus-them camps.
One can easily imagine the water reallocation scenario as
the result of federal regulation supported by national environmental nongovernmental organizations and opposed
by a local farming community and its local government.
As the interests square off, all the factors discussed above
get in the way of the appeal to nonzero-sumness: instead
it’s crop values versus estuary values, national versus local,
long time frames, farmers’ loss of water creating diffuse
benefits, no reliable dollar signs on the benefit side, and all
being crammed down on the farmers by federal regulation
with no compensation. One must be rather insensitive to
expect the farmers not to suffer from zero-sum mentality
in that story line.
Environmental policy needs to take the zero-sum
mentality seriously. Pitching environmental regulation as
nonzero-sum while not considering pockets of small-scale
dynamics that look much more like zero-sum has led over
and over to conflict, litigation, and bruised relationships.
Ignoring the problem by refusing to speak of zero and
nonzero also does not help. This is why work on collaborative adaptive management, quantification of ecosystem
services, resilience, and other ingredients of adaptive governance is essential to pursue and sustain.
Adaptive governance must seek to identify pockets of
perceived zero-sum games within the larger SES management context, and work with the “losers” to achieve a better framing of the dynamics and explore policy options to
counter the zero-sum mentality. Adaptive governance cannot change the physical and social realities of SESs—they
have many metrics, are multi-scalar, evolve over time, are
uneven in distribution, and are difficult to quantify—but
adaptive governance can change the polarizing effect of
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government intervention and help all participants communicate more openly about perceived zero-sum problems
and their solutions.

III. Strategies for Zero-Sum Challenges
This section was authored by Jim Salzman, UCSB Bren
School and UCLA Law School.
Politicians love to talk about the glossy world of “WinWin Scenarios.” Battling climate change will also grow
the renewables sector and create thousands of green jobs.
Catch-shares programs will increase the fishing community’s incomes and conserve fisheries. Energy conservation saves fuel bills and drives efficiency improvements.
Famed Harvard Business School professor, Michael Porter, has even hypothesized that countries with stricter
environmental regulations are more competitive in the
global marketplace.12
To be sure, there are plenty of examples of win-win scenarios in the environmental field, but it is wishful thinking to assume that many, much less most, environmental
conflicts can be solved with all parties better off. It is often
the case that one or more parties feel trapped in a zero-sum
game. Farmers in the Klamath Valley see their irrigation
water allocation reduced because the endangered salmon
need more. Fish win. Farmers lose. In the Pacific Northwest’s spotted owl saga of the 1990s, logging companies
lost access to old growth redwood stands that were deemed
to be critical habitat for the endangered owl. Owls win.
Loggers lose. One could easily provide similar examples in
the pollution context.
Most environmental policies have winners and losers.
One might argue that these policies benefit society overall,
but it sure does not feel like a benefit to the local resourcedependent communities. These are decisions with diffuse
winners and locally concentrated losers. To them, they are
trapped in a zero-sum conflict where they need to stand
their ground against opposing interests who would have
them reduce their emissions, water usage, or timber harvest. “Either I win and continue the status quo, or they win
and I have to pay, or perhaps even go out of business.”
Given the ubiquity of such zero-sum framing, it should
not be surprising that environmental law has developed a
range of strategies to address them. They fall under three
basic categories: There Should Be Losers, Grow the Pie, or
Regulatory Flexibility.
• The first category, There Should Be Losers, recognizes the zero-sum game for what it is and lets the
consequences flow. Put another way, there are some
activities or actors that should lose out. This is a normative position, of course, that favors certain results
over others. Companies that discharge dangerous
toxics into a local stream should be forced to stop,
12. Michael Porter & Claus van der Linde, Towards a New Conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. Econ. Persp. 117 (1995).
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even if it does hurt their bottom line. In the zerosum conflict of continuing polluting versus safe
waters, safe waters should win. This may seem a satisfying strategy, but keep in mind that the measure
of “unacceptable” behaviors varies according to the
observer. Conservation interests may well view overgrazing on public lands as a travesty that has gone on
for far too long. Ranching interests take the opposite view. Which will win out in a zero-sum conflict
of grazing versus range conservation? That depends
on which administration is running the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM). A strategy that assumes
the losers in zero-sum conflicts deserve to lose looks
great if your team is in power. It can seem punitive or
worse if you are on the losing side. No wonder, then,
that this strategy leads to protracted litigation, overblown rhetoric, and, in the extreme, armed standoffs
such as the one that occurred at the Malheur Wildlife Refuge.
• A second category seeks to Grow the Pie. What
looks like a zero-sum game with only eight slices of
pie to go around, morphs into a win-win scenario if
suddenly the pie is enlarged with four more pieces
to go around because the government pays off the
losers. We generally see this approach where the
potentially losing party is politically powerful. As
J.B. Ruhl has documented, agricultural interests are
more often paid to protect the environment than
required to do so. Some fisheries facing restrictions
have benefited from vessel buyback programs. The
farmers and fishers may be losing, in the sense their
actions are restricted, but at least they are being paid
for the sacrifice. Similarly, the 1990 Clean Air Act
(CAA)13 Amendments explicitly sought to compensate coal mining communities for the expected losses
in jobs digging high-sulfur Appalachian coal. Growing the pie can be a popular strategy for the parties
involved, but not so attractive to taxpayers and those
concerned over budget deficits. If regulation proves
politically infeasible, however, then growing the pie
may be palatable. Even here, though, the parties may
not all be happy. Penn Central was certainly not content to receive tradable development rights for Grand
Central Station in place of its lost air rights, nor do
some environmental groups approve of paying farmers not to pollute.
• The third category presents the Regulatory Flexibility of growing the pie. Here, the losers are paid
off through regulatory paths rather than through
dollars. This is evident in the Clean Water Act’s
(CWA’s)14 §404 permit program for wetlands. On
its face, the program seems to prohibit dredging
and filling wetlands under a wide range of circum13. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q; ELR Stat. CAA §§101-618.
14. 3 U.S.C. §§1251-1387; ELR Stat. FWPCA §§101-607.
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stances. In practice, wetlands mitigation banking acts as a political steam valve, allowing much
development to proceed by compensating with constructed wetlands somewhere else. We see a similar
dynamic with habitat conservation plans. Developers who would have perceived the lack of a permit as
a zero-sum dynamic—local economic growth versus
a wetland or endangered fly—instead see, if not a
win-win dynamic, at least a situation where the costs
of doing business are acceptable and the project goes
forward. Like growing the pie, regulatory steam
valves tend to be put in place when the losers are
politically powerful and regulating them runs either
legal or political risks.
None of these strategies is necessarily better than the
other. The relative merits of There Should Be Losers, Grow
the Pie, and Regulatory Flexibility will vary depending
on the politics of the actors, the nature of the harm, and
the public funds available. The key point is that zero-sum
games need to pay special attention to the losers, whether
they warrant compensation and, if so, what type of benefit
is most appropriate.

IV.

Deep Equity, Zero-Sum
Environmentalism, and a
Sustainable Planet

This section was authored by David Takacs, Professor of Law,
UC Hastings College of Law.
As humans appropriate ever more of the planet’s bounty,
leaving less for nonhuman species and the ecosystems they
inhabit, conflicts emerge over who or what gets which
resources. Such skirmishes result in some of the unproductive zero-sum framings we too often see.
These zero-sum skirmishes extend to what are the
appropriate frames through which to view the natural
world, and thus how we set priorities to manage that world.
Are ecosystems gardens to be cultivated and manipulated
for human needs? Or are they wildernesses imbued with
intrinsic value, whose species are valuable for their own
sake, to be managed for continued ecological function and
evolutionary potential?
In three of my research arenas, promoters of new
conservation strategies split the difference, modulating between nature as sacred and nature as profane. In
all cases, these three multifaceted approaches to solving
problems serve as counter-narratives to win-lose, zerosum environmentalism.
Public funders and private investors are pouring billions of dollars into Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in the developing
world. In REDD+, investors pay people to preserve carbon in trees, and then sell credits based on the stored
carbon to those who wish to offset their own greenhouse
gas emissions. In biodiversity offsetting, rapidly gaining
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currency as a tool that (potentially) promotes prudent
economic and ecological planning, developers degrade
biodiversity in one place in exchange for paying to protect
it elsewhere. And the South African government is managing water as ecological infrastructure in its attempt to
fulfill the constitutionally guaranteed right to safe, clean
drinking water. Focusing on the 8% of the nation’s land
that provides the source for 50% of its water, policymakers plan simultaneously to create more and cleaner water,
augment local ecosystem services, protect nonhuman
species, and create jobs for poor people in rural areas.
Each of these examples presents nonzero-sum solutions
to environmental problems and broadens the way we
frame the problems in the first place.
Zero-sum framings do not mesh with an ecological worldview, which requires that we look at connections among multiple entities across time and space and
reconsider the currencies by which “wins” and “losses”
are tallied. In the three examples above, currencies
(potentially) expand beyond immediate financial gain
and loss to include local and global ecosystem services
provided, greenhouse gases mitigated, aesthetic and biophilic benefits accrued, democratic decisionmaking participation rights enjoyed, human rights of present and
future generations guaranteed, jobs created, and economies grown. This gives us a more expansive view of who
might “win” when we implement novel approaches to
environmental problems.
Before we throw the zero-sum paradigm out with the
bathwater, we must acknowledge that underlying some
zero-sum framing is the practical and ethical principle
that someone does have to pay to effect environmental
solutions, and someone should have to pay. For all the
multiple winners in multiple currencies, some people do
lose. In REDD+ (as its promoters portray it), northern
nations (through their citizens and businesses) pay, and
poor people and the biodiversity that sustains them win.
In biodiversity offsetting, the developer (and those benefiting from new development) pay, and biodiversity (and
people at the new offset site with new, enhanced ecosystems) may win. And in South Africa, the rich, major
water consumers pay through cross tariffs and taxes (and
wealthy landowners’ property use may be restricted in
various ways)—while poor people gain by acquiring subsidized, clean water. In all three, those who prize diverse
ecosystems, the biodiversity those systems harbor, and
the ecosystem services they provide win. But even those
who do not explicitly prize these ecological assets nonetheless benefit from enhanced environmental amenities,
albeit in more diffuse ways, harder to quantify by traditional zero-sum means.
I am implying here that some entities—the polluters,
those who consume more than their fair share—should
lose, at least by paying for their consumption and pollution, and others should gain. In international environmental law, the ethical principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities” (CBDR) compels all nations to steward
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the global commons, but requires wealthier nations to
make greater contributions. As an emerging principle
of customary international law, legal obligations stem
from pragmatic reality rooted in ethical obligation. Pragmatically, only some nations have financial resources to
mitigate environmental damage and help others adapt
to environmental disruptions; ethically, those resources
come from economies that developed without paying for
environmentally destructive externalities. CBDR, applied
to nations in the law, is also available as an ethical principle that underlies the drive to have wealthy individuals
transfer some of that wealth to clean up environmental
messes we have created from our overconsumption and
overproduction. So, in the examples here, the carbon
polluter, the ecosystem degrader, and the water glutton
should pay so that those who suffer from greenhouse gas
pollution, from ecosystem degradation, and from lack of
clean water may benefit.
By taking a more multidimensional approach to environmental problem solving—by naming multiple winners
and fewer losers, by highlighting ecological connections,
and by trading in different currencies—each of these three
efforts aims to be sustainable. They must be: (1) effective—
they work for all stakeholders with little complication;
(2) synergistic—they maximize benefits for local people
and nonhuman entities; and (3) equitable—they narrow
disparities between poor and rich. Specifically, to achieve
sustainability over the duration of a nonzero-sum program,
any environmental law should be implemented in a deeply
equitable way.
By “deep equity,” I refer to laws, policies, and values
promoting sustainable pathways that act in synergy to
maximize the health and potential of all individuals, communities, and ecosystems. The equity is “deep” because
values become rooted within each individual, and because
equity requires that we fundamentally re-imagine our
community structures and responsibilities, and that we
root these values and responsibilities in our legal systems
and policy choices. Our laws and policies would, in turn,
support values and actions promoting even deeper equity.
To make a deeply equitable world, we should abandon
the dualisms of zero-sum environmentalism and expand
both the currencies with which we calculate “winners and
losers” and our notions of who the short- and long-term
beneficiaries really are. While the devil always lies in the
fine print of how programs are implemented in law and in
practice, if done well, REDD+, biodiversity offsetting, and
managing water as ecological infrastructure can all lead
us away from dualistic zero-sum thinking about environmental problems and lead us to more holistic, equitable
visions of a shared future on a sustainable planet. While
that planet will continue to be a reservoir of ecological
resources for humans to exploit to fulfill our needs and
desires, it will also be one that stewards ecological function
and the evolutionary process, and sustains the majestic,
nonhuman world.
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Beyond Zero-Sum Thinking for
Environmental Law

This section was authored by Keith Hirokawa, Associate
Professor of Law, Albany Law School.
The issue addressed here—zero-sum thinking and its
application to environmental law—questions whether
environmental quality is appropriately characterized as a
zero-sum game in which regulation is an expensive, jobdestroying monster.15 Describing a choice as a zero-sum
game can be insightful for understanding the architecture of choice in a battle of particular circumstances. The
notion of the zero-sum game comes from game theory and
describes an “I win, you lose” (or vice versa) situation in
which the amount you lose is proportional to my gains in
winning. The game provides insights into how particular
resolutions may have been predictable or even beneficial
under the circumstances.
However, when posed as a zero-sum game, environmental quality appears too costly: every dollar spent
on the environment takes food from the table of some
employee. Aside from the problem that the zero-sum
characterization is seldom, if ever, an accurate description
of environmental regulation, this zero-sum framing presumes that environmental values are somehow divorced
from economic livelihoods.
Ecological economist Gretchen Daily defines “ecosystem services” as the “wide range of conditions and processes
through which natural ecosystems, and the species that are
part of them, help sustain and fulfill human life.”16 In addition to the goods (food, timber, etc.) produced in the environment, functioning ecosystems supply essential services,
including drinkable water and breathable air, biodiversity,
habitable climate circumstances, and even spiritual and
culturally significant experiences.17 Of course, because the
services provided by functioning ecosystems are often not
exchanged in the marketplace, they have been routinely
ignored and undervalued.18 The study of ecosystem services
15. As noted in the dissenting opinion to Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S.
Forest Service, 681 F.3d 1006, 42 ELR 20116 (9th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2256 (U.S., Mar. 18, 2013):
a number of people will lose their jobs and the businesses that have
invested in the equipment used will lose much of their value. . . .
No legislature or regulatory agency would enact sweeping rules that
create such economic chaos, shutter entire industries, and cause
thousands of people to lose their jobs.
Id. (objecting to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision
to require §7 consultation under the ESA for Notice of Intent to operate
mining operations in the Klamath River Basin).
16. Gretchen Daily et al., Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human Societies
by Natural Ecosystems, 2 Issues Ecology 1, 2 (1997); Robert Costanza
et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387
Nature 253, 253 (1997); Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems
and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, at v (2005).
17. U.S. EPA Science Advisory Board, Valuing the Protection of Ecological
Systems and Services 8 (EPA-SAB-09-012) (May 2009), available at http://
www.epa.gov/ecology/publications.htm.
18. James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics,
and Law, 20 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 309, 311 (2001); Keith H. Hirokawa
& Elizabeth J. Porter, Aligning Regulation With the Informational Need:
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illustrates the manner in which ecosystem processes have
real value according to the benefits provided.19
The ecosystem services approach helps to overcome
zero-sum rhetoric in at least three ways:
(1) More and better information. Valuing the environment as a provider of services recasts the problem of environmental degradation as one that can
be calculated.20 Viewing the environment as services also helps in identifying the types of information needed to solve environmental problems, such
as baseline information on environmental function
and the potential of conservation and resiliency
planning to secure the continuing receipt of ecosystem benefits. By prioritizing this information,
ecosystem services analysis helps to calculate the
cost of losing ecosystem function by revealing the
direct and indirect benefits people and communities receive from the environment.
(2) Willingness to pay. Ecosystem services requires an
appraisal of ecosystem functionality. This approach
helps explain why the interruption of ecosystem
process (by transformation, degradation, or displacement) results in real losses to human wellbeing. Typically, our reliance on and need for
particular ecosystem functions is undervalued until
we experience changes in the environment. Once
essential ecosystem services are diminished or lost,
we understand their value as a cost of finding substitute services: clean water, clean air, water quality
control facilities, and so on.21 Likewise, information
regarding the flow of ecosystem benefits provides an
understanding of human well-being that identifies
people as the beneficiaries of environmental quality
and supports protection of ecosystem function as an
investment that yields great returns.
(3) Availability of win-win-win alternatives. To see
an alternative in which everyone wins is not to force
an exception or search for an outlier. The winning
alternative is almost always available and, when
promoted as such, can be very persuasive. Recent
examples include green building (which not only
drives innovation and development, but produces
healthier, longer lasting structures); renewable
energy development (driving technological developments to produce cheaper, cleaner energy); and
Ecosystem Services and the Next Generation of Environmental Law, 46 Akron
L. Rev. 963 (2013).
19. Costanza et al., supra note 16, at 253.
20. David Batker et al., Gaining Ground—Wetlands, Hurricanes and the
Economy: The Value of Restoring the Mississippi River Delta 21 (2010),
available at http://www.eartheconomics.org/FileLibrary/file/Reports/
Louisiana/Earth_Economics_Report_on_the_Mississippi_River_Delta_
compressed.pdf (“Ecosystem service valuation assigns a dollar value to
goods and services provided by a given ecosystem. This allows for proposed
management policies to be considered in terms of their ability to improve
ecological processes that produce the full diversity of valuable ecosystem
goods and services.”).
21. Costanza et al., supra note 16, at 255.
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energy- and water-efficient products (products that
demand fewer resources in design, construction,
and operation). Better calculations of ecosystem
services facilitate a conversation about cooperation,
complementary values, and co-benefits, revealing
that sound environmental choices do not result in
“I win, you lose.” For instance, an assessment of
urban tree functions shows that trees in urban areas
provide services (shade and climate control, water
filtering, stormwater capture) that offer significant
benefits at a minimal cost for installation and maintenance. In comparison, construction and maintenance of the grey infrastructure alternatives (A/C
systems, water filtration plants, stormwater control
facilities) are expensive to construct and maintain.
Zero-sum descriptions can be useful. However, they may
also misdirect our attention in matters of environmental
decisionmaking, and to that extent, thinking about environmental problems in zero-sum stories is short-sighted.
Communities that investigate the alternatives created by
ecosystem services have made efficient, valuable choices
that will contribute to community well-being in significant
ways. Watershed planning for water supply in New York
City, urban forest planning in Charlotte, North Carolina,
and wetlands planning in Portland, Oregon, have proven
that ecosystems serve human well-being in essential ways.
Win-win-win alternatives are found in functioning ecosystems. We only need to see ecosystems as opportunities.

VI. Zero-Sum Environmental Governance
This section was authored by Shannon Roesler, Professor of
Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
The political climate that facilitated the passage of major
pollution-control statutes, such as the CAA and the CWA,
may seem difficult to imagine today. When the U.S.
Congress passed the major pollution-control laws in the
1970s, it was responding to a growing consensus that federal environmental regulations were essential to protection
of human health and the environment. In their absence,
many feared that states would engage in a “race to the bottom,” setting lax environmental regulations in an effort to
attract industry and economic growth. Policymakers also
recognized that environmental pollution increasingly presented problems of scale; pollutants emitted into the air
and discharged into water bodies did not always remain
within the political borders of a state. A federal role was
perceived as a necessary means to ensure the efficient regulation of interstate pollution.
Today, political support for new environmental regulations at the federal level appears less uniform, particularly given the resistance to federal regulation by a sizeable
number of states. Along with industry, states now routinely file lawsuits challenging new environmental regulations as abuses of federal power. Instead of thinking
seriously about shared governance, the political default
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in many states is to litigate with the hope of invalidating
the federal rule.
This turns environmental governance into a zero-sum
jurisdictional game; if the federal rule is invalidated, the
state wins, and if it stands, the state loses. When states
treat environmental governance as a zero-sum game, they
preclude the consideration of win-win scenarios. Along the
way, time, effort, and money are wasted in protracted legal
battles that delay important protections for human health
and the environment.
Somewhat ironically, today’s landscape of state-federal
litigation takes place against a model of shared state-federal governance. Every student of federal pollution-control laws learns that they depend on a regulatory model
often called “cooperative federalism.” Under this model,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses its
rulemaking authority to set minimum standards limiting
the release of harmful pollutants into the environment,
and state-level agencies typically implement and enforce
these standards through permit processes. States also have
some flexibility in deciding how to implement standards
and meet other federal requirements. For example, under
the CAA program that establishes ambient air quality
standards for certain harmful pollutants, like carbon
monoxide and ground-level ozone,22 states draft their own
state implementation plans for meeting these standards.
State policymakers therefore have an opportunity to tailor
their emission-control policies to fit their economic and
social needs.
This model is theoretically “cooperative” because it
depends on voluntary cooperation by state governments.
States implement CAA and CWA permitting and enforcement because they prefer to have control over these processes, and often receive federal money and assistance in
return. But if states opt out (or fail to meet the federal
requirements), the federal government can step in and
implement the regulatory program at issue, an arrangement often called conditional preemption.
Despite this cooperative model, the current litigation practices of some states tell an uncooperative—even
hostile—story. Consider Texas. According to the Texas
Tribune,23 the state of Texas sued the Barack Obama
Administration at least 48 times. In over one-half of these
cases, Texas challenged EPA action regarding air and water
quality standards. A sizeable subset of these lawsuits (eight)
involves climate change regulation. The total bill for these
challenges adds up to over $1.8 million.
Texas is not, of course, the only state to challenge federal environmental laws. Since EPA issued its Clean Power
Plan (CPP) last year, more than one-half of the states,
along with utilities, energy companies, and other industry and labor groups, have filed dozens of lawsuits alleging
that EPA’s plan for reducing carbon emissions from power
22. See U.S. EPA, Criteria Air Pollutants, available at https://www.epa.gov/
criteria-air-pollutants.
23. See Neena Satija et al., Texas v. the Feds—A Look at the Lawsuits, Tex. Trib.,
Jan. 17, 2017, https://www.texastribune.org/2017/01/17/texas-federalgovernment-lawsuits/.
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plants violates the CAA and unconstitutionally intrudes
upon the states’ authority to set energy policy.24 (These
suits are now part of consolidated litigation before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit.) The CPP sets emissions targets for each state, with
the goal of achieving a 32% reduction from 2005 levels by
2030.25 After the U.S. Supreme Court made the unusual
decision to stay EPA’s plan last spring, 19 states suspended
their planning processes under the CPP, further delaying
meaningful planning for emissions reductions and threatening to undermine U.S. compliance with the Paris climate change agreement.26 Notably, states are divided on
the issue; 18 states, along with various local governments,
nonprofits, and industry groups, have filed briefs in support of the plan.27
Roughly as many states28 also challenged EPA and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (the Corps’) 2015 Clean
Water Rule, a regulation that seeks to clarify which water
bodies and wetlands are covered by the CWA.29 Supreme
Court opinions regarding the relevant CWA language
are splintered and leave many questions unanswered. In
the Clean Water Rule, EPA and the Corps attempted to
make their approach to CWA jurisdiction more predictable
and transparent. But rather than waiting to see how the
Clean Water Rule would function in practice, many states
jumped to the zero-sum strategy: sue to invalidate. In litigation against both the Clean Water Rule and the CPP,
states have argued that federal regulation unconstitutionally alters the state-federal balance of power by expanding
federal regulatory power into areas traditionally regulated
by the states.
Significantly, this zero-sum view of environmental
governance is not confined to the offices of state attorneys general. Legislators in several states have introduced
bills and resolutions that suspend state planning efforts
under the CPP or characterize the plan as an abuse of
federal power. For example, a resolution introduced in
the Arizona Legislature calls on the state governor and
attorney general to defend the state against “overreaching regulations.”30
Some states may have valid objections to aspects of the
CPP and the Clean Water Rule. The critical question, however, is whether a zero-sum litigation strategy is the best
24. See E&E’s Power Plan Hub, E&E News, http://www.eenews.net/interactive/
clean_power_plan.
25. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources, Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 60).
26. See E&E’s Power Plan Hub, Supreme Court Stay Response, E&E News, http://
www.eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan#planning_status_chart.
27. See Clean Power Plan in the Courts, Battle Lines, E&E News, http://www.
eenews.net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal_battle_lines.
28. See Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water Rule in Court, The Hill,
June 30, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/246539-27states-challenge-obama-water-rule-in-court.
29. Clean Water Rule, Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg.
37053 (June 29, 2015).
30. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, States’ Reactions to EPA
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, Apr. 18, 2016, available at http://www.
ncsl.org/research/energy/states-reactions-to-proposed-epa-greenhouse-gasemissions-standards635333237.aspx.
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way to resolve these concerns. Consistent with the CAA’s
shared governance structure, the CPP recognizes that states
will need time to develop emissions-reduction plans; it also
allows states flexibility in how they meet their reduction
targets and recognizes the role of interstate cooperation
through regional trading plans. In the absence of comprehensive federal climate legislation, the CPP is at present the
only realistic road toward meeting our national responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Litigation is only
delaying meaningful action.
Moreover, even if states “win” the jurisdictional battle,
the victory will be costly. In addition to litigation costs,
states may lose opportunities to shape national environmental policy and to mitigate costly environmental and
public health risks. As the “cooperative” ideal of environmental federalism recognizes, environmental regulation
should not be a zero-sum game.
Of course, the nature of cooperative (or competitive)
federalism shifts with each administration’s regulatory
agenda. President Trump chose Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt as his EPA Administrator, a choice the
U.S. Senate recently confirmed. As reported in the New
York Times and elsewhere, Pruitt has helped lead the coalition of Republican attorneys general in their zero-sum
litigation of federal environmental regulations, including
the CPP.31 After serving as EPA Administrator for just
over two weeks, he publicly questioned the scientific consensus that emissions of greenhouse gases are “a primary
contributor” to global warming.32 In addition, President
Trump has already directed EPA to begin the long process
of rewriting the Clean Water Rule, and he is expected to
sign an executive order regarding the CPP.33 Pruitt will
oversee administrative efforts to dismantle these and
other regulations.
We may soon see some states play a very different role:
one designed to defend EPA and cooperative federalism. States that acted early to curb carbon emissions, for
example, are likely to oppose federal efforts to reconsider
regulations and climate policies. But these kinds of court
challenges are not examples of zero-sum strategies. Instead,
they are efforts to preserve the basic architecture of environmental law, a structure that promotes jurisdictional
pluralism without jeopardizing minimum standards and
international commitments.

31. See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, Trump Picks Scott Pruitt, Climate
Change Denialist, to Lead EPA, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/12/07/us/politics/scott-pruitt-epa-trump.html?_r=0.
32. See Coral Davenport, EPA Chief Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/
politics/epa-scott-pruitt-global-warming.html.
33. See Coral Davenport, Trump Order Will Aim to Roll Back a Clean Water
Rule, N.Y. Times (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/27/
us/politics/trump-clean-water-epa.html.
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VII. Zero-Sum Games in Pollution Control:
The Games We Create Versus the
Games We Discover
This section was authored by Robin Kundis Craig, James I.
Farr Presidential Endowed Professor of Law, University of
Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.
Environmental pollution lands us in zero-sum games.34
The more interesting question is: Do we discover these
games? Or do we invent them? In other words, are there
hard environmental limits on how much anthropogenic
pollution natural systems can absorb, which we eventually
discover? Or do we create zero-sum games for pollution
purely because of our own goals for both ecosystems and
SESs (a recognition that human societies are both part of
and depend upon functioning ecosystems)? In fact, we do
both, and the intersection of the two in a climate-change
era is worth examination.
There is no doubt that natural systems respond to, and
can be altered by, human pollution, and at all sorts of
scales. The emerging discipline of resilience theory posits
that ecosystems can exist in alternative stable states and
that they transform from one state to another by crossing
an ecological threshold.35 While resilience theory imposes no
normative value on these alternative states,36 as a pragmatic
matter, humans tend to find one state more desirable than
the others. Relatedly, and importantly, crossing an ecological threshold in one direction is often easier than reversing
the process. Thus, when ecosystems are in human-desired
states, keeping that system from crossing an ecological
threshold in the first place is often far less costly than trying to restore the ecosystem afterward. Thus, identifying
ecological thresholds and the most desirable of alternative
states can help to inform legal and policy goals.
Pollution often prompts one of the most common
ecological transformations—namely, the eutrophication
of water bodies as a result of excess nutrient (nitrogen
and phosphorus) pollution.37 Eutrophication transforms
aquatic ecosystems from clear, oxygenated, and often
cooler waters that can support a variety of plant and animal
species to ecosystems dominated by algae, hypoxic (lowoxygen), or anoxic (no-oxygen) warmer water, with greatly
34. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern developed the concept of zerosum games as part of their invention of game theory. Thomas S. Ferguson,
Game Theory II-4 (UCLA Department of Mathematics 2011). In game
theory, a zero-sum game is one in which no wealth is created or destroyed;
one person’s gain must result in another person’s (or persons’) loss to the
same amount or degree. Id. More colloquially, zero-sum games can be
viewed as problems where there is a single unchanging “pie” of resources
and several people are seeking to increase the size of their slice; they can only
do so by decreasing the amount of pie available to everyone else.
35. Lance H. Gunderson & Crawford S. Holling, Panarchy:
Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems 34
(2001).
36. Brian Walker & David Salt, Resilience Thinking: Sustaining
Ecosystems and People in a Changing World 7-9 (2006).
37. Ocean Service Education, Nutrient Pollution—Eutrophication, NOAA, http://
oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/estuaries/media/supp_estuar09b_
eutro.html (revised Mar. 25, 2008).
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reduced biodiversity.38 Moreover, once an aquatic system
has become eutrophic, restoring it to its previous and often
more productive ecosystem state can be very difficult.39
Thus, eutrophication thresholds could be considered to
define a zero-sum pollution game that we have discovered.
Specifically, if we are pursuing a normative goal of keeping
an aquatic system in its non-eutrophic state (which is, in
fact, what people usually want), the aquatic system’s capacity to absorb nutrients without transforming defines a limited pollution “pie” for achieving that governance goal. If
polluters have reached this capacity, no polluter can increase
its nutrient pollution without either another polluter having to reduce its pollution or the system transforming.
The entire planet may also be limited in how much pollution of various sorts it can absorb without transforming
into—well, something radically different than the planet
we and our hominid relatives have enjoyed for the last
12,000 years during the Holocene. In Big World, Small
Planet: Abundance Within Planetary Boundaries, Johan
Rockström and Mattias Klum describe the Planetary
Boundaries Project.40 This project is the effort of a team
of scientists to identify key planetary boundaries—parameters that, if exceeded, risk transforming the entire Earth
and its ecosystems.41 In its 2014 update to the original
2009 research, the team identified nine such planetary
boundaries.42 Three of these—the “Big Three”—reflect
“processes with sharply defined global thresholds” that are
“hard-wired into the Earth system and cannot be shifted
by human actions,” processes that “are capable of sharp
shifts from one state to another, with direct implications
for the entire planet.”43
These Big Three planetary boundaries are climate
change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidification.44 Notably, the planet is at risk of crossing all three
of these boundaries because of human pollution—respectively, greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting chemicals, and
anthropogenic carbon dioxide.45 In addition, the risks of
exceeding three other planetary boundaries—biochemical flows (nutrient cycles), atmospheric aerosol loading,
and novel entities (toxics)—are directly related to anthropogenic pollution, with the scientists concluding in 2014
that we are already at high risk of exceeding the phosphorus and nitrogen limits.46 (The other three planetary
boundaries are biodiversity, freshwater consumption, and
land use change.)47
38. Id.
39. Stephen R. Carpenter, Eutrophication of Aquatic Systems: Bistability and
Soil Phosphorus, 102, No. 29 Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences (PNAS) 10002-05 (July 19, 2005), available at http://www.pnas.
org/content/102/29/10002.full.pdf.
40. Johan Rockström & Mattias Klum, Big World, Small Planet:
Abundance Within Planetary Boundaries 64-77 (2015).
41. Id. at 64.
42. Id. at 65 fig. 2.1.
43. Id. at 69.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 65 fig. 2.1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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One way of interpreting the results of the Planetary
Boundaries Project, therefore, is that we have discovered
that much pollution is, ultimately, a zero-sum game at
the planetary scale—at least if we want to avoid transforming the Earth into a very different state of being,
one that is probably far less hospitable to the current
forms of life existing here (including us). There is decent
evidence that if people and governments believe and
appreciate the systemic risks from pollution, they eventually will act (at least so far as the capacity to act exists)
to reduce those risks, particularly if they can do so relatively cheaply and easily.
For example, scientists discovered a recurring hole in the
atmospheric ozone layer in 1984 and published their results
in Nature in May 1985.48 By September 1987, the world’s
nations had agreed to the Montreal Protocol on Substances
That Deplete the Ozone Layer, a treaty that phased out
the production and consumption of many ozone-depleting chemicals.49 In June 2016, scientists reported that the
ozone hole is starting to “heal.”50 Thus, stratospheric ozone
depletion is one pollution-related planetary boundary from
which the world appears to be retreating.
However, not all zero-sum pollution games result from
“discovered” natural limits of ecological thresholds and
planetary boundaries. Instead, some of these games reflect
human regulatory choices about the environmental quality
that we desire. For example, the United States and Canada
noticed acid rain problems in the 1960s and 1970s.51 Acid
rain was clearly affecting ecosystems such as maple forests
and lakes in both countries52; whether it was driving them
toward ecological thresholds and transformations is a far
more open question.
Nevertheless, in 1990, Congress amended the CAA
to impose a comprehensive “cap-and-trade” program for
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, effectively creating a
regulatory zero-sum game for emissions of these pollutants.53 In 1991, Canada and the United States entered into
a treaty to address acid rain, effectively extending the capand-trade concept across national boundaries.54 Cap-andtrade programs are regulatory zero-sum games: The “cap”
sets the total amount of pollution allowed (the “pie”), while
the trading reflects the fact that one polluter’s need to emit
beyond its assigned allowance must be matched by another

polluter’s (or polluters’) willingness to reduce its (their)
emissions below those allowances.55
Water pollution in the United States is also subject to
regulatory zero-sum games, in the form of the CWA’s total
maximum daily load (TMDL) requirements.56 The TMDL
is the total amount of a pollutant that a water body can
take in on a daily basis without violating its state-defined
water quality standards.57 These water quality standards
reflect both the uses of the water body that were present
in 1972 and the state’s as-yet-unattained use goals for that
water body, with a general national goal that all water bodies should be fishable and swimmable.58 Thus, with few
exceptions, states do not set water quality standards to
reflect actual ecological thresholds, but rather the uses that
exist or can be restored within the current system state.59
As such, water quality standards and the TMDLs that
result from them are not “discovered” zero-sum pollution
games. Instead, TMDLs, like cap-and-trade programs,
are regulatory zero-sum games created to achieve humandefined pollution reduction goals. The total amount of pollutant allowed under the TMDL is divided among natural
background sources and human sources of the pollutant,
requiring human sources that exceed their assigned allowance to reduce their pollutant contribution levels.60 EPA
and the states are also beginning to experiment with water
quality trading for certain pollutants,61 providing a marketbased method for polluters to adjust their individual pollution levels under the TMDL—but the market only works
because the TMDL creates a legal zero-sum pollution game.
In the absence of clearly stated environmental quality
goals—national ambient air quality standards under the
CAA, 62 water quality standards under the CWA 63 —and
a regulatory program for achieving them, humans tend
to operate as if pollution is not a zero-sum game right up
until the point where they push a system across a threshold
or boundary. As a result, ambient environmental quality
goals and regulatory zero-sum games—the zero-sum pollution games that we invent—can keep us from having to
discover that pollution is a zero-sum game at a larger scale
(at least to the extent that we want to avoid ecosystem and
planetary transformations). Moreover, given that it is often
hard to fight our way back when we hit those limits—it
has taken almost three decades for the ozone hole to begin

48. Joseph C. Farman et al., Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal
Seasonal ClOx/NOx Interaction, 315 Nature 207-10 (1985).
49. United Nations, International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer: 16
September, http://www.un.org/en/events/ozoneday/background.shtml (last
visited Jan. 25, 2017).
50. Aaron Sidder, Remember the Ozone Hole? Now There’s Proof That It’s Healing,
Nat’l Geographic (June 30, 2016), available at http://news.national
geographic.com/2016/06/antarctic-ozone-hole-healing-fingerprints/.
51. Gene E. Likens & Richard T. Holmes, The Discovery of Acid Rain, Yale
Books Unbound (May 4, 2016), http://blog.yupnet.org/2016/05/04/
discovery-acid-rain/ (May 4, 2016).
52. Id.
53. Pub. L. No. 101-549, Title IV, 104 Stat. 2584 (Nov. 15, 1990).
54. Environment and Climate Change Canada, Canada-United States Air
Quality Agreement, Government of Canada, https://www.ec.gc.ca/air/
default.asp?lang=En&n=83930AC3-1 (as viewed Jan. 26, 2017). The treaty
itself is available at http://www.ijc.org/rel/agree/air.html.

55. Rosaly Byrd & Laurèn Demates, An Introduction to Cap-and-Trade Systems
Around the World, Huffington Post (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/rosaly-byrd/an-introduction-to-carbon-cap-and-trade_
b_6737660.html.
56. 33 U.S.C. §1313(d).
57. U.S. EPA, Implementing Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Impaired Waters
and Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), https://www.epa.gov/tmdl (last
updated Sept. 21, 2016).
58. 33 U.S.C. §1313(c); 40 C.F.R. §131.3(i).
59. See What Are Water Quality Standards?, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.
gov/standards-water-body-health/what-are-water-quality-standards
(last
updated Nov. 3, 2016) (describing how states set water quality standards).
60. 40 C.F.R. §130.2(i).
61. Frequently Asked Questions About Water Quality Trading, U.S. EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/npdes/frequently-asked-questions-about-water-qualitytrading (last updated July 8, 2016).
62. 42 U.S.C. §7409.
63. 33 U.S.C. §1313(c).
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to respond to the Montreal Protocol, and many eutrophic
water bodies remain transformed—the concepts of ecological thresholds and planetary boundaries suggest that
defining more regulatory zero-sum pollution games might
help us to define and stay within safe operating spaces for
human activity (assuming our science is good enough to
identify those boundaries and thresholds accurately).
Of course, the elephant in the room is climate change.
Is climate change a zero-sum pollution game? The many
debates over the “proper” target for atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations (350 parts per million of carbon dioxide, or 400, or 450) suggests that both climate
change scientists and climate change activists perceive
climate change to be zero-sum.64 Moreover, the politics of
climate change mitigation negotiations are clearly driven
by perceptions that parceling out emissions reduction commitments and total emissions limits creates winners and
losers—people who get more or less than their fair shares
of a limited emissions “pie.”65
But climate change, as usual, is more complex than
just the mitigation zero-sum game. The Planetary
Boundaries Project scientists consider climate one of two
“core” boundaries (biodiversity is the other), because
the climate system has “a decisive role, on [its] own, in
determining the outcome of the planetary state.”66 With
respect to pollution, if the world refuses to acknowledge
and play the climate change mitigation zero-sum game,
the parameters of many of the other zero-sum pollution
games are likely to change on us, calling into question
the continued viability of the zero-sum pollution games
we have created.
Many forms of pollution are sensitive to temperature,67
for example, and climate change may make many of the
environmental quality goals that bound regulatory zerosum games impossible to achieve—for example, groundlevel ozone goals, 68 water temperature goals, 69 ocean pH
goals.70 Thus, climate change impacts push many ecosystems, and perhaps the planet as a whole, toward transformation, and it is important to remember that the zero-sum
64. Arthur Neslen, Carbon Dioxide Levels in Atmosphere Forecast to Shatter
Milestone, The Guardian (June 13, 2016, 11:41 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2016/jun/13/carbon-dioxide-levels-inatmosphere-forecast-to-shatter-milestone (discussing the 400 ppm and
450 ppm thresholds, noting that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change has settled on the latter); 350.org, The Science, available at
https://350.org/about/science/ (as viewed Jan. 25, 2017) (document its and
Dr. James Hansen’s commitment to 350 ppm as a goal).
65. Most famously, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change sought to impose greenhouse gas emissions
reduction targets on developed nations. United Nations, United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, available at http://
unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (as viewed Jan. 25, 2017).
66. Rockström & Klum, supra note 40, at 71.
67. Daniel J. Jacob & Darrell A. Winner, Effect of Climate Change on Air
Quality, 43 Atmospheric Env’t 51, 54-55 (2009).
68. Id. at 60.
69. Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now
What?, 1 Wash. & Lee J. Energy, Climate, & Env’t 9, 12, 19-20 (Spring
2010).
70. Robin Kundis Craig, Dealing With Ocean Acidification: The Problem, the
Clean Water Act, and State and Regional Approaches, 90 Wash. L. Rev. 1583,
1612-27 (Dec. 2015).
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pollution games we invent are, ultimately, dependent on
the zero-sum pollution games we discover.

VIII. Making Economic Development and
Job Creation Drivers of Serious Action
on Climate Change and Environmental
Protection
This section was authored by John C. Dernbach, Commonwealth Professor of Environmental Law and Sustainability
and director of the Environmental Law and Sustainability
Center at Widener University Commonwealth Law School.
We’re fighting for policy changes that will make it possible for us to have better choices; utilities that offer
us renewable options, electric trains that make shorthaul flights obsolete, public transit. Exxon and its ilk
have been fighting for decades to keep these choices
out of our reach, and then claim that we are voting
with our dollars every time we sit in traffic or heat our
homes with fossil fuels supplied by a utility that has a
monopoly. They can play gotcha as much as they want,
but all it proves is how badly we need better options.71
				
—Bill McKibben

One of the most long-standing narratives in environmental law and politics is the alleged necessity of choosing
between development and environment. The narrative persists in industrial projects, dams, mines, shale-gas development, highways, construction projects, and in a variety of
other projects and activities. As Bill McKibben points out
in the quote above, it also persists in the debate about what
to do about climate change. In every case, some people win,
and some people lose. The narrative, based on conventional
development, has a built-in zero-sum game—development
or environment.
A competing narrative, which has been slowly gaining supporters over several decades, is built on the idea of
sustainable development—development and environment.
When there are attractive ways of making environmental
protection and economic development mutually reinforcing, there is a way of escaping the zero-sum framing of
environmental issues, including climate change. As McKibben says, people want better choices.
The conflict between these narratives goes to the heart
of the divide on environmental policy between the national
Republican Party (which tends to embrace conventional
development and tends to see environmental programs as
a diminution of national wealth) and the national Democratic Party (which, without a lot of fanfare, has tended
to embrace sustainable development). As of this writing,
it appears that newly elected President Trump has begun,
in the name of conventional development, to wreck much
71. Bill McKibben, Embarrassing Photos of Me, Thanks to My Right-Wing
Stalkers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/08/07/opinion/sunday/embarrassing-photos-of-me-thanks-tomy-right-wing-stalkers.html?_r=0.
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of the climate change and environmental law and policy that the Obama Administration built on sustainable
development grounds. In the name of economic development and job creation for fossil fuels, President Trump
appears to be willing to destroy or weaken programs that
build the economy and create the very jobs that he envisions for the renewed America. The real choice, then, is
not between development and the environment. The real
choice is between conventional development and sustainable development.
The economic and job creation benefits of action on
climate change, for example, can be enormous. The rapidly growing attractiveness of increased energy productivity (which measures the economic value created per
unit of energy used) and renewable energy illustrate the
point. Almost 900,000 workers spend more than one-half
their time doing energy efficiency work. Energy efficiency
companies expect that an additional 245,000 jobs will
be created over the next year.72 Energy productivity also
does something that fossil fuels can no longer consistently
do; it saves people money. Doubling energy productivity
would save the U.S. economy $327 billion annually after
subtracting investment costs, and generate 1.3 million
new jobs.73
Renewable energy has reached grid parity in nearly the
entire country, according to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration74 as well as two investment banks, Lazard75
and Deutsche Bank.76 That is, the life-cycle cost of electricity from wind and solar is at or below the cost of electricity from coal, nuclear, and gas, even without subsidies. As
a result, jobs in wind and solar are growing rapidly. The
total number of solar energy jobs (373,807) is more than
twice the total number from mining and electrical generation from coal (160,119), and slightly more than the total
from extraction and electrical generation from natural gas
(362,118).77 Another 101,738 persons work in the wind
industry.78 In 2016, employment in the solar and wind
industries grew by 25% percent and 32%, respectively.79
These figures do not include the considerable benefits to
72. Environmental Entrepreneurs (E2) & E4TheFuture, Energy
Efficiency Jobs in America: A Comprehensive Analysis of
Energy Efficiency Employment Across All 50 States 4 (2016),
available at https://www.e2.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Energy
EfficiencyJobsInAmerica_FINAL.pdf.
73. Alliance to Save Energy, American Energy Productivity: The Economic,
Environmental, and Security Benefits of Unlocking Energy Efficiency
9-10, 13-14 (2013), available at http://www.ase.org/sites/ase.org/files/rhg_
americanenergyproductivity_0.pdf.
74. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Levelized Cost and
Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the
Annual Energy Outlook 2016 at 6 (2016), available at http://www.eia.
gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf.
75. Lazard, Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis—Version 9.0
at 2 (2015), available at https://www.lazard.com/media/2390/lazardslevelized-cost-of-energy-analysis-90.pdf.
76. Deutsche Bank Markets Research, Industry: Solar 78-79 (2015),
available at https://www.db.com/cr/en/docs/solar_report_full_length.pdf.
77. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Energy and Employment Report 29 (2017),
available at https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/03/f30/U.S.%20
Energy%20and%20Employment%20Report.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 8.
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the United States of global action on climate change80 or
the enormous costs of not acting.81
If properly and forcefully advocated and understood,
economics and job creation could change the narrative of
development or environment that the Trump Administration appears to embrace. Environmental protection and
climate change were not major issues in the 2016 election,
and the political truth may be that the electorate is interested in economic development and job creation no matter
what the source of, or driving force for, these jobs. Thus,
economic development and job creation need to be understood as drivers for action on climate change and environmental protection, and not simply forces to be blunted.
Economic development, in fact, has been a principal reason for many of the environmental protection laws that
have been adopted in the United States over the last several
decades—including those for renewable energy, energy
efficiency, recycling, and organic food.82 Making economic
development and job creation a driver for serious action on
climate change and environmental protection, of course,
subverts the conventional development model.
The conventional development model on which the first
narrative builds has had large global consequences, both
positive and negative. It can be described like this:
Conventional Development
Progress
• Peace and security
• Economic development
• Social development/ human
rights/healthy communities

Price of Progress
• Environment and natural
resources
• Living people who depend
on environment and natural
resources who are harmed
(health, property, etc.)
• Future generations that are
harmed

Conventional development, or simply development, is
built on the idea of maximizing peace and security as well
as economic and social development. It was given considerable impetus by a variety of treaties and international
institutions created at the end of World War II, and is
directed at improving human freedom, opportunity, and
quality of life.83 The model has worked in many ways; there
has not been a third world war; the global economy has
grown considerably; and people are living longer, tend to
be healthier, and are better educated. Most of us would call
that progress.
80. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change in the
United States: Benefits of Global Action (2015), available at https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/cirareport.pdf.
81. Marshall Burke et al., Global Non-Linear Effect of Temperature on Economic
Production, 527 Nature 235 (2015) (concluding that unmitigated warming
is likely to reduce average global incomes by 23% by 2100).
82. John C. Dernbach, Creating the Law of Environmentally Sustainable
Economic Development, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 614 (2011).
83. John C. Dernbach & Federico Cheever, Sustainable Development and
Its Discontents, 4 Transnat’l Envtl. L. 247, 256-61 (2015); John C.
Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance,
49 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 8-32 (1998).

Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

47 ELR 10342

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

But the model comes with a price, and it begins (but
does not end) with widespread and growing environmental degradation, including climate disruption. Simply put,
the model is based on an approach to decisionmaking that
treats the environment as secondary in importance or as
an afterthought. If it were just about the environment
alone, that would be bad enough. But nearly all damage
to the environment also hurts other humans in some way,
sooner or later—through air or water pollution, disrupted
communities, and the many ways in which a changing
climate is already making life harder and more expensive.
And many of the people who will be harmed have not yet
been born.
Conventional development, then, comes with a builtin trade off. It can only be justified in utilitarian terms;
in environmental and human rights terms, conventional
development asks too much. By benefiting some people
at the expense of others, conventional development is
also inequitable. The utilitarian calculus, moreover, only
works if the benefits outweigh the costs, and many of
the environmental and human costs are not, or cannot
be, calculated. Finally, any system with such substantial
built-in costs is an inefficient way of improving overall
human well-being.
The basic idea behind sustainable development is to
transform development, not simply to relabel it—to
move from “development or environment” to “development and environment.”
Sustainable development can be depicted as follows:
Sustainable Development
•
•
•
•

Progress
Peace and security
Economic development
Social development/ human rights/healthy communities
Environment and natural resources protection and restoration

Essentially, sustainable development moves environment and natural resources from the “price of progress”
column into the “progress” column. Because the adverse
effects of environmental degradation tend to disappear as a
result, there is no need for the “price of progress” column.
Sustainable development is also directed at human freedom, opportunity, and quality of life, but places greater
emphasis on future generations.
In any given sustainable development context, from
specific projects or activities to national plans and policies,
decisionmakers are to integrate environmental considerations and goals into the decisions they make. Sustainable development provides a framework for creating new
approaches that produce both environmental and development benefits, and encourages a more aggressive use of
legal and policy tools that had been often considered of
marginal value. Energy-efficiency standards adopted or
strengthened in the United States since 2009 for appliances such as clothes washers and air conditioners, for
instance, are projected to save consumers more than $540
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billion by 2030.84 U.S. government-funded research and
development—another tool that is often overlooked—has
played a substantial role in reducing solar energy costs and
thus increasing global demand for solar energy.85 Both of
these advance equity because they reduce the amount of
money that people, especially poor and low-income people, need to spend on energy. Sustainable development
thus provides a way for public and private decisionmakers
in all countries to get past the apparent conflict between
development and environment.
These new approaches are increasingly evident in a
variety of contexts, including business and industry,
higher education, local governance and sustainability, and
brownfields redevelopment, 86 but progress thus far has
been slow and uneven.87 Where progress has occurred, a
key factor is that sustainable development generally produces greater net benefits than conventional development.
These benefits include higher quality of life, reduced costs,
and economic development.88 The sustainable development framework can also generate a variety of economic,
social, and environmental benefits; not just one type of
benefit (primarily economic).
In addition, the total economic, social, and environmental outcomes of a project or activity animated by
sustainability are likely to be greater than they would be
if these outcomes offset each other in major ways (e.g.,
when the economic development benefits of a project or
activity are offset to some degree by its environmental and
human costs). For all the benefits that coal has brought
to the national economy over two centuries, for example,
air pollution from coal fired-power plants (sulfur dioxide,
nitrous oxide, and particulates) caused $62 billion in public health damage and significant premature human mortality in 2007, even after more than three decades of air
pollution control.89
The critical point, in other words, is that sustainable
development can produce greater net economic benefits
than conventional development, and can also provide a
range of social and environmental benefits. These benefits,
as McKibben points out, include choices that people want,
like renewable energy and public transit. Sustainable development also provides a more politically compelling frame
for justifying serious action on climate change than perhaps any other possible frame. For more than two decades,
84. U.S. Department of Energy, Saving Energy and Money With
Appliance and Equipment Standards in the United States (2016),
available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/02/f29/Appliance%20
Standards%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%202-17-2016.pdf.
85. The White House, United States Mid-Century Strategy for Deep
Decarbonization 35 (2016), available at http://unfccc.int/files/focus/
long-term_strategies/application/pdf/us_mid_century_strategy.pdf.
86. John C. Dernbach et al., Progress Toward Sustainability: A Report Card, in
Agenda for a Sustainable America 16 (Dernbach ed. 2009).
87. John C. Dernbach et al., Acting as if Tomorrow Matters:
Accelerating the Transition to Sustainability 9 (2012).
88. Id. at 289-90.
89. Committee on Health, Environmental, and Other External
Costs and Benefits of Energy Production and Consumption &
National Research Council, Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced
Consequences of Energy Production and Use 6, 340 (2010).
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both red and blue states have taken action to address climate change, primarily by fostering energy efficiency and
renewable energy, through a variety of different legal tools,
and they have done so primarily for economic development, job creation, technological innovation, and social
equity reasons.90 Similarly, the Obama Administration and
others have justified action on climate change on economic
development and job creation grounds.91 Profs. Hari Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel have synthesized a large body of
psychological research and concluded that refocusing climate change efforts on economic development and disaster
resilience is likely to provide a way of getting past partisan
divisions on energy and climate change in many contexts.92
This approach is not a panacea; advocates of fossil fuels
tend not to be interested in economic development in a
broad sense; they are interested in economic development
based on fossil fuels. Still, focusing on economic development and job creation from energy productivity and
renewable energy has a decent record of success. If we are
to avoid the worst effects of climate change and protect
the environment, we must use the sustainable development
framework to give a higher priority to economic development and job creation—starting now.

IX. Energy Policy: No Place for
Zero-Sum Thinking
This section was authored by Inara Scott, Assistant Professor,
College of Business, Oregon State University.
The popular notion of a zero-sum game is a scenario in
which, for one party to gain value, another party must
lose it. We can imagine a pie cut into six pieces, with six
people standing beside it. For any one individual to get two
pieces means someone else must go hungry. One of the key
assumptions here, of course, is that the number of slices of
pie is fixed. We cannot add to the pie.
Any simplistic metaphor is certain to break down under
scrutiny, but in the energy context, this image is particularly inapt. In December 2005, natural gas was trading
around $15.39 per million British thermal units. Today,
the price is closer to $2.90.93 The reason for this precipitous
drop? New techniques in fracking and horizontal drilling
in shale rock, which allowed developers to shake loose massive stores of natural gas that had previously been inaccessible. The pie suddenly got a whole lot bigger.
Improvements in materials and efficiency have also drastically lowered the cost of renewable energy generation—
so much so that current cost projections for 2020 are half
what they were about a decade ago. The cost of wind energy
90. John Dernbach and the Widener University Law School Seminar on Global
Warming, Moving the Climate Debate From Models to Proposed Legislation:
Lessons From State Experience, 30 ELR 10933 (Nov. 2000).
91. Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 Emory L.J.
695, 726-29 (2016).
92. See id.
93. Natural Gas, Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
commodity/natural-gas (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
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alone fell almost 60% from 2009-2015.94 If we think of the
pie as the amount of renewable energy we can generate per
dollar, there can be no doubt it continues to grow.
Unfortunately, in the energy context, the pie can also
shrink. The same shale gas that grew the natural gas
pie could soon dry up, for regulatory or safety reasons.
Fracking has been associated with an increase in earthquake activity.95 The controversial technique also uses
significant amounts of groundwater (a touchy subject in
drought-stricken areas, including California)96 and can
contaminate groundwater with its dangerous mixture of
chemicals.97 While some seek to close loopholes and regulate fracking at the federal level,98 states like New York have
banned the practice entirely, citing significant health and
safety concerns.99
Rather than use a metaphor like the zero-sum game,
some prefer shorthand like “winners and losers” to emphasize that, in the environmental context, choices inevitably have both positive and negative consequences. For
example, in fragile desert ecosystems, massive solar towers
that concentrate heat and produce clean energy have also
resulted in bird deaths and converted habitat for giant tortoises.100 So, for the solar tower to be the winner, we have
presumably got to accept that the tortoise will be the loser.
In coal country, the story goes, the coal miner is the “loser”
and the environment is the “winner,” never mind that it
was largely the low cost of natural gas and renewables,101
not environmental regulation, that put the miner out of a
job and created record levels of unemployment and poverty
in his community.102
94. Scott Nyquist, Lower Oil Prices but More Renewables: What’s Going
On?, McKinsey & Company (June 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/
industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/lower-oil-prices-but-more-renewableswhats-going-on.
95. For a variety of data and information, see U.S. Geological Survey, Induced
Earthquakes, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/research/induced/ (last visited
Sept. 12, 2016).
96. Bobby Magill, Water Use Rises as Fracking Expands, Sci. Am. (July 1, 2015),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/water-use-rises-as-frackingexpands/.
97. Gayathri Vaidyanathan, Fracking Can Contaminate Drinking Water, Sci.
Am. (Apr. 4, 2016), available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
fracking-can-contaminate-drinking-water/.
98. A recent decision by the U.S. District Court for Wyoming ruled that
BLM did not have the authority to regulate fracking. BLM Fracking Decision Is Narrow, but With a Vast Impact, Law360 (July 1, 2016,
11:06 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/812000/blm-fracking-decisionis-narrow-but-with-a-vast-impact.
99. Freeman Klopott, N.Y. Officially Bans Fracking With Release of Seven-Year
Study, Bloomberg (June 29, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-06-29/n-y-officially-bans-fracking-with-release-of-seven-yearstudy.
100. Union of Concerned Scientists, Concentrating Solar Power Plants, available
at http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-energy/concentratingsolar-power-plants#.V9gD-zuyuAQ (last visited Sept. 12, 2016); Ken
Wells, Tortoises Manhandled for Solar Splits Environmentalists, Bloomberg
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-20/
tortoises-manhandled-for-solar-splits-environmentalists.
101. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, Levelized Cost and
Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the
Annual Energy Outlook 2016 (Aug. 2016), available at https://www.eia.
gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf.
102. Declan Walsh, Alienated and Angry, Coal Miners See Donald Trump as
Their Only Choice, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.
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In a winner-loser or zero-sum formulation, the roles are
simple and straightforward: for the environment to win,
the coal miner must lose. But what actually happens when
the environment “wins” at the expense of the miner? Sorry
to report: everyone loses.
• The coal miner loses first because he has no job.
But then he loses again because this broad-brush
approach labels him as someone who is opposed to
environmental protection. Rather than someone who
simply wants to be able to provide for his family and
make a decent living, the coal miner becomes the bad
guy who hates the environment. And in that way, his
community loses too; it loses jobs and faces a future
of environmental antagonism, as coal communities
now believe that for them to win, the environment
must lose.
• Sadly, the environmentalist does not really win,
either. By advocating for a policy that is seen as putting coal miners out of work, the environmentalist
must contend with significant political pressure on
federal, state, and local governments to overrule or
amend environmental legislation or tie up regulation through costly court battles.103 Moreover, once
the environmentalist and the coal miner are seen as
enemies, both lose the opportunity to work together
for solutions to simultaneously advance their interests, as could be the case with economically beneficial
carbon legislation.104
Importantly, just like a zero-sum characterization, this
winner-loser scenario breaks down under scrutiny. The coal
miner is a loser only if his interest is construed narrowly:
i.e., to work at a coal mine. If his interests are defined more
broadly as desiring a job and a way to support his family,
the coal mine could close and he could still be a winner.
An analysis by Adele Morris of the Brookings Institution
shows that a carbon tax could provide ample revenues to
support job retraining and retirement benefits for displaced
coal workers, as well as fund mine reclamation, all with
positive economic outcomes.105 The coal miner is a “loser”
if we narrowly confine our analysis of the situation to one
issue (coal mine closure), instead of looking broadly for
policies that could reduce carbon and build communities
at the same time.
Winner-and-loser thinking implies that the winner is
not just passively benefitting from a scenario, but is actively
com/2016/08/20/world/americas/alienated-and-angry-coal-miners-seedonald-trump-as-their-only-choice.html.
103. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Future Power Sector Carbon
Dioxide Emissions Depend on the Status of the Clean Power Plan (May 18,
2016), available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=26292.
104. Dana Nuccitelli, In Charts: How a Revenue Neutral Carbon Tax Creates
Jobs, Grows the Economy, The Guardian (June 13, 2014), https://www.
theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2014/
jun/13/how-revenue-neutral-carbon-tax-creates-jobs-grows-economy.
105. Adele C. Morris, Build a Better Future for Coal Workers and Their
Communities, The Brookings Institute (Apr. 25, 2016), available at
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Build-a-BetterFuture-for-Coal-Workers-and-their-Communities-Morris.pdf.
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fighting against the loser. By talking about the environmentalists and coal miners as winners and losers, the coal
miner reasonably believes the environmentalist is working
against him and benefitting at his expense. In fact, coal use
is declining in large part because of the economic competitiveness of natural gas and renewables, which in turn was
fueled by the growth in the “pie” of natural gas supplies
due to fracking and technological advances in renewable
energy generation. Zero-sum and winner-and-loser thinking obscures the real history here, and impedes environmental progress.
These are not the days for zero-sum thinking. The stunning turn of the 2016 presidential election highlighted the
dangers of winner-and-loser thinking: this time, it was the
environmentalists who were the “losers” and the coal miners the “winners.” But this is precisely why it is time to
rethink our approach to environmental politics. As long
as we narrowly look at environmental issues without considering economic justice and the health of communities,
we will keep creating lose-lose situations. The environment
does not benefit when a generation of people think it is
their enemy, and the environmentalists will never win as
long as they see coal miners as their adversaries.
I believe to continue our progress in addressing climate change and environmental protection, we have got
to think bigger—think holistically—to avoid the winnerloser dichotomy. Environmental actions must be paired
with social and economic justice programs, ensuring that
efforts to create a “win” for the environment do not create
a “loss” for vulnerable populations, economically disadvantaged communities, and people of color. We cannot
think narrowly about closing the coal mine—we have
got to think broadly about how to restore communities.
We cannot “fix” the environment and then, as an afterthought, worry about the impacts of environmental policies on people.
Energy policy is enormously complex, with technology
constantly changing the economics of sources and options
available to meet future energy needs. While there are most
certainly positive and negative consequences to resource
options, our ability to mitigate negative consequences may
change at a bewildering pace,106 even as the industrial and
technological landscape evolves and changes. Now is the
time to set aside shallow characterizations and go deeper
and look more creatively at our long-term objectives and
policy choices.
Policies impacting energy and the environment must be
analyzed together for their impacts on communities and
individuals. Narrowing our gaze creates winners and losers. Effective energy policy requires the optimism to consider how to grow the size of the pie, the humility to know
that the future is uncertain, and the foresight to challenge
our assumptions and look for ways to work together to
reach common goals.
106. Susan Kraemer, One Weird Trick Prevents Bird Deaths at Solar Towers,
CleanTechnica (Apr. 16, 2015), https://cleantechnica.com/2015/04/16/
one-weird-trick-prevents-bird-deaths-solar-towers/.
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Questioning the Value of Solar

This section was authored by Shalanda H. Baker, Associate
Professor of Law, University of Hawai’ i School of Law.
At last, energy—that elusive thing that exists all around
us, sustains myriad plant and animal life, and illuminates
our homes—no longer requires massive infrastructure to
be harnessed and converted into electricity. Technology
now allows individuals and communities to erect solar
panels that convert the sun’s rays into electric currents to
power homes, hospitals, and community centers. This rare
moment in the transition of the energy sector from a system in which electricity is generated by burning fossil-fuels
in centralized locations managed by public utilities, to a
system where a range of electricity generation and management alternatives exists, has spurred a heightened level of
regulatory and economic turmoil in jurisdictions around
the United States. The disequilibrium created by customersited energy generation threatens to destabilize and reinvent our energy system. If only we would let it.
Industry observers attribute the swift rise of rooftop
solar adoption over the past decade to progressive policies and rapid technological advancements. Tax incentives
have effectively decreased the cost of owning and installing
solar panels. Net energy metering policies pay rooftop solar
owners at the customer’s retail electricity rate for each kilowatt-hour of electricity generated by the customer. These
programs leave some customers with electricity bills totaling zero dollars, effectively turning their electricity meters
backwards when solar panels are fully engaged.
This dramatic increase in customer-sited distributed
energy generation has challenged the utility sector and
destabilized the so-called regulatory compact, whereby
utilities receive a regulated reasonable return on electricity infrastructure investments in exchange for providing
electricity. The overall dynamic confronting utilities in this
transitional moment has led to what some have termed the
“utility death spiral.” In the new, distributed-energy paradigm, utilities can no longer rely on the prior revenue levels
from their customer bases to recover costs for infrastructure improvements or to recoup their regulated reasonable
return on such investments. Further, in an era of increased
distributed energy generation, utilities cannot easily predict
what types of infrastructure investments are needed. Thus,
they face a “death spiral,” a term that reflects an operating
environment with rife economic uncertainty.
As a result of these economic challenges, utilities have
fought for preservation of the status quo. They argue that
net-energy metering places an unfair burden on customers
who lack access to solar panels. To support this argument,
they note that net-energy-metering customers tend to generate electricity during the day, during low electricity usage
hours, and draw electricity from the grid during peak electricity usage times, but because net-energy metering zeroes
out the electricity bill of such customers, these customers
never pay their fair share to maintain the grid. Thus, utili-
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ties argue, rooftop solar customers create a “cost shift” to
those who cannot, due to poverty, home ownership status,
or geography, install solar panels.
These assertions have given rise to a debate. In regulatory proceedings exploring the fairness of such net-energy
metering programs, regulators around the country have
begun to ask, “What is the value of solar?” Said another
way, does the compensation amount offered to net-metering customers overcompensate such customers for their
contributions to the electricity grid and overvalue distributed energy contributions? If the answer is yes, as utilities have argued, then compensation should be adjusted
downward to account for the cost of delivering distributed
energy to the grid. Under this formulation, the utility’s
guaranteed return on investment, which it recoups from
the customer rate base, would be spread more broadly
among the customer base because solar adopters would
receive less economic value for the electricity service they
provide. Further, by lowering the compensation rate for
rooftop solar, the utility retains more economic value and
is spared from “shifting” the cost of grid maintenance (and
the regulated return) on to non-solar customers.
The foregoing framing sets the stage of this unique transitional moment. By most observations, what has emerged
is a battle between the traditional and the disruptive.
Indeed, the increasing number of individuals able to generate electricity through rooftop solar panels is perceived as a
threat to utility incumbents, whose current business model
depends on a stable base of electricity customers to contribute to the cost of maintaining the grid. Any economic
gains rooftop solar customers receive harm non-solar customers in equal measure.
The transition to a cleaner energy system, some utilities
suggest, should be done through investments in large-scale
renewable energy projects rather than distributed energy
generation. For their part, solar companies, the disruptive
innovators that make rooftop solar panels, see utilities as
antiquated and resistant to change. Solar companies have
argued that increased rooftop solar adoption “greens” the
grid and creates decentralized pockets of electricity generation that offer grid stability in volatile weather. Traditional
utilities, they argue, must adapt their business models to
the increasing amount of distributed energy resources on
the grid, or become obsolete.
But this framing obfuscates what is at stake: a just energy
transition. Moreover, it limits opportunities for true transformation of the energy system and the regulatory model
that supports it. In this zero-sum formulation, the direct
benefit gained by solar adopters is a precise measure of the
additional payments that must be paid by other customers
to maintain the grid, pay for the costs of grid improvements, and ensure the utility’s return on investment. In
this frame, the question whether the regulatory model is
itself a useful or just feature of a modern energy system is
sidelined, never asked, in favor of calculating whether nonsolar customers somehow bear the cost of paying the utility’s guaranteed return. In its very asking then, the question

Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

47 ELR 10346

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER

regarding the true value of solar immediately loses its disruptive potential. Locked within a flawed frame, the question, and answer, will always be marred by the measure
of what is lost by the utility customer and gained by some
other party—a customer, a solar company. Most tragically,
these calculations will almost always be made within a regulatory model that is itself undisturbed.
At its core, the energy transition invites a reckoning
and accounting of the existing energy system. The energy
transition provides an opening to expose the injustice
embedded in the existing energy system, and the ways
this system’s ongoing reliance on centralized generation, centralized ownership, and the regulatory compact
may actually foster climate change vulnerability, climate
injustice, and environmental injustice. The transition
offers a rare moment, within its early-design phases, to
examine the myriad ways in which the old energy system
divests individuals and communities of true choice and
participatory decisionmaking with respect to meeting
their energy needs.
The transition also allows us to examine alternative economic models, such as community power, for the delivery
of electricity. Such an analysis could help to expose the
challenges of energy poverty, energy security, and energy
access in this country; provide an opening to critique the
socioeconomic aspects of the energy system itself that
require families to make difficult choices between paying
the electric bill and buying groceries; and offer viable alternatives to the existing energy system.
To uncover these tremendous stakes, rather than ask,
“What is the value of solar?”, legislators and regulators
might instead ask, “What is the cost of a failure to transition to a decentralized, clean system of electricity generation and distribution, where ownership of energy is spread
among diverse stakeholders and the cost of energy is drastically reduced?” Further, what is lost, and what remains,
if the status quo ante persists? What might a new energy
system, incorporating principles of economic fairness,
energy democracy, and climate and environmental justice,
look like?
This new manner of questioning inverts the frame and
allows for a broader exploration of what is at stake during this transition—as viewed from the perspective of
what is possible, rather than from within the limitations
of the existing paradigm. It places the incumbent in the
foreground as a subject of critique and examination, rather
than frame the disruptor as the subject of critique and
examination or, misleadingly, as our collective savior.
This questioning further invites the exploration of the
range of possible regulatory and economic solutions to
facilitate a just transition to a clean energy future. It allows
policymakers to trim away the irrelevant elements of the
current electricity system to expose the vibrant aspects of
the system that must be preserved during this moment of
transition. It also allows for deeper innovation considering the opportunity posed by distributed energy resources
and alternatives to large-scale energy development. In
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short, shifting the incumbent from background to foreground releases the blinders imposed by the “value of solar”
frame—itself a zero-sum postulation that pits solar adopters against non-solar customers—and allows for a comprehensive consideration of energy justice.
When regulators ask, “What is the value of solar?”
embedded at the end of the question, in an invisible parenthetical, are the words, “to the existing system.” Such
framing answers the question before it is asked, because it
assumes preservation of the system itself, which is to say,
a centralized electricity grid, a traditional electricity utility, regulated returns on investment, and the same system
of energy production and distribution. By virtue of this
discursive framing, the question itself is relegated to the
margins and value is evaluated within a pre-defined system, from which pre-defined units of value are extracted.
Although some jurisdictions have begun to move beyond
the purely economic framing of the answer to the value of
solar question to incorporate environmental considerations,
I would argue that the question itself must be interrogated.

XI. Less Than Zero: The Zero-Sum Game
That Hurts Local Communities and
Ecologies
This section was authored by Jonathan Rosenbloom, Professor
of Law, Drake University Law School.
Local communities and their ecology suffer hardship
from a zero-sum game over governance authority.107 This
game pits communities (and their local governments,
including special purpose districts) against state governments in a constant and unwinnable(ish) conflict over the
authority to regulate or, as often happens, not regulate.108
Although this zero-sum game is a struggle between states
and communities over the authority to make policy, the
manner in which it is skewed against local communities
has dire consequences on the environment and discourages local communities from protecting and investing in
their local ecology.109
107. For purposes of this essay, “governance authority” refers to the legal power
a specific level of government has to act. This essay is predominantly
concerned with governance authority at the local and state levels. For a more
in-depth discussion over how governance authority is divided among levels
of government, see Blake Hudson & Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon
Approaches to Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and Climate
Change, 64 Hastings L.J. 1273 (2013).
108. See, e.g., City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1285 (Colo.
2002) (en banc) (invalidating local use of automated photograph system
recording traffic violations for having an extraterritorial impact); People ex
rel. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 243 P.2d 397,
402 (Colo. 1952) (en banc) (same concerning telephone rates); City of Des
Plaines v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 357 N.E.2d 433, 435-36 (Ill. 1976) (same
concerning local noise pollution controls); Harris Bank of Roselle v. Vill. of
Mettawa, 611 N.E.2d 550, 558-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (same concerning
private treatment of wastewater); Holiday Universal, Inc. v. Montgomery
County, 833 A.2d 518, 524-27 (Md. 2003) (same concerning prohibition
on unfair practices in service contracts).
109. See Keith Hirokawa & Jonathan Rosenbloom, The Cost of Federalism: Ecology,
Community, and the Pragmatism of Land Use, in The Law and Policy of
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In our federalist form of government, states hold plenary power. Since the mid-19th century, most courts have
held that local governments are creatures of and subject to
the whim of state legislatures.110 Two limitations on state
legislative control over local communities are state constitutions111 and state statutes.112
State and local governments frequently exercise regulatory authority over critical environmental issues, such as
those related to fracking, waste management, and water.
As a legal matter, local authority to intervene in potentially controversial activities may turn on whether that
authority has been preempted by the state or even the federal government. While the preemption analysis varies by
state, it typically prohibits local governments from regulating: (1) where the state expressly preempts local action;
(2) where the state heavily regulates the field (but does not
expressly preempt); and (3) where there is a direct conflict
between the state and local regulation (again, in lieu of
express preemption).113
Preemption analysis is structured in a way that forms
a zero-sum game. If the state wins and preempts a local
law, the local community loses the ability to regulate in
that area and the local action is null and void. In rare cases
where local communities win,114 states may or may not have
concurrent authority. While state and local governments
often simultaneously regulate, zero-sum disputes typically
arise after an actual conflict surfaces and the case turns to
preemption—where there can be only one winner.
When it comes to the environment, structuring local
authority to regulate around a zero-sum game has at least
two unintended consequences: (1) it may be perceived as
absolving some governmental entity (whichever loses the
preemption struggle) from responsibility over the sustainable management of natural resources; and (2) it discourages local communities (typically the losers in preemption
struggles) from investing in their ecology by disempowering them, even though they often have the greatest potential exposure to environmental harms.
The regulation of pesticides and fertilizer in the Mississippi watershed provides an example of communities having little or no regulatory authority over a natural resource,
even though that resource is critical to the provision of
local services and pollution of that resource directly affects
Environmental Federalism: A Comparative Analysis (Kalyani Robbins
& Erin Ryan, eds. 2015).
110. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 174-80 (1907) (holding that
local governments are creatures of state law and that the U.S. Constitution
does not protect local governments from state government intrusion). But
see Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 482-86 (1968) (holding that a
state may not create a general purpose local government that apportions
voting unequally in violation of the Constitution).
111. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 43 ELR 20276
(Pa. 2013) (holding state’s attempt to preempt local government regulation
of fracking was in violation of state constitution).
112. See, e.g., Virginia Code §15.2-2280 (authorizing local communities to
regulate land uses).
113. Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State Preemption, Common Pool
Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 Harv. Envtl.
L. Rev. 445, 451 (2012) (citing Talbot Cnty. v. Skipper, 620 A.2d 880, 88283 (Md. 1993)).
114. See, e.g., Robinson, 83 A.3d at 901.
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them. Most of the regulatory authority over agricultural
runoff of fertilizers and pesticides is left to the states.115
Whether local governments are authorized to regulate in
large part depends on whether the relevant state has preempted local authority.
In most agricultural states in the Mississippi watershed, the regulation of pesticide and fertilizer by local
governments is straightforward—they cannot do it. In
Iowa, for example, “A local governmental entity shall not
adopt or continue in effect local legislation relating to the
use, sale, distribution, storage, transportation, disposal,
formulation, labeling, registration, or manufacture of a
pesticide”116; and “A local governmental entity shall not
adopt or continue in effect local legislation relating to the
use, sale, distribution, storage, transportation, disposal,
formulation, labeling, registration, or manufacture of a
fertilizer or soil conditioner.”117
To be sure, Iowa is not alone. Thirty states expressly
preempt local governments from interfering with pesticide
use and 13 more allow local governments to act only upon
approval from state bodies.118 Only seven allow local governments to regulate pesticide use in their local communities—and none are in the Mississippi watershed.119
Here is an example of the state “winning” the zero-sum
game through express preemption. The state wins in the
sense that it, and not the local community, has the authority to regulate (when the state exercises that authority, the
actual winner may be the farming industry and the losers
are those dependent on the water as drinking water).
Even when a state does not expressly preempt local
action, it can still “win” and displace local control. For
example, Humboldt County, Iowa, passed an ordinance
stating: “No person . . . shall . . . apply livestock manure
on any land in Humboldt County that drains into an
agricultural drainage well or sinkhole in a manner that
results in the contamination of groundwater.”120 The Iowa
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance, ruling it was
preempted because it established a higher standard than
the state’s standard for the regulation of confined ani115. Nonpoint source is not defined in the federal CWA. National Wildlife
Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166, n.28, 13 ELR 20015 (1982). In
1987, EPA defined nonpoint source pollution as pollution:
[C]aused by diffuse sources that are not regulated as point sources
and normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural and
urban runoff, runoff from construction activities, etc. . . . In
practical terms, nonpoint source pollution does not result from
a discharge at a specific, single location (such as a single pipe)
but generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric
deposition, or percolation.
U.S. EPA, Office of Water Regulations and Standards Nonpoint Source
Guidance (Aug. 1987). The classification of agricultural runoff from federal
regulation is being challenged in Bd. of Water Works Trustees v. Sac Cty. Bd. of
Super., No. C 15-4020-MWB (N.D. Iowa).
116. Iowa Code Ann. §206.34.
117. Iowa Code Ann. §200.22.
118. Matthew Porter, State Preemption Law: The Battle for Local Control of
Democracy, Pesticides & You, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Fall 2013), available at
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/assets/media/documents/lawn/activist/
documents/StatePreemption.pdf.
119. Id.
120. Goodell v. Humboldt, 575 N.W.2d 486, 490 (1998) (citing Ordinance 24:
groundwater protection).
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mal feeding operations.121 Here was an attempt by a local
community to internalize or manage the external impacts
stemming from agricultural runoff in its jurisdiction, and
that ordinance was struck down because it provided more
protection.
The examples above illustrate that allocating authority
in a zero-sum way disconnects communities from their
ecology, even though communities are primarily responsible for securing and maintaining critical services that
depend on the local ecology. For example, runoff deteriorates the very ecosystem (resulting in toxic algae blooms
and the dead-zone in the Gulf of Mexico) on which communities rely to provide basic services (such as potable
water)122 and recreation.123
Prohibiting or discouraging local communities from
implementing best practices to sustainably manage the
watershed, including buffer strips, zoning for manure
stacks, limits on storage and application, and setbacks,
disincentivizes communities from engaging and protecting their local ecology. This is not to suggest that local
governments always seek to protect natural resources.
Rather, it is to suggest that local governments be permitted to take action when they are protecting the health of
their local ecology.
The examples also raise unexplored questions, including:
Whether the state vs. local binary analysis oversimplifies
the complexities embedded in regulating multi-jurisdictional ecosystems? Whether it is a justifiable method for
regulating the environment? Is state preemption a hidden
means to permit one local use with large externalities to
trump another local use that wants to stop those externalities? As it stands, structuring local communities’ authority
around zero-sum battles results in the environment getting
the short end of the stick and communities coming out less
than zero.

XII. Deconstructing Zero-Sum
Environmental Games: Bears Ears
National Monument as Reparations
and Reconciliation
This section was authored by Sarah Krakoff, Raphael J. Moses
Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
Owls versus jobs. Water for farmers versus water for
salmon. Big dam versus tiny fish. Environmental disputes
are often described in this way, as contests over limited
resources that require one side to lose in order for the other
121. Id. at 505.
122. See, e.g., Business Record, Your Guide to the Water Works Lawsuit,
available at http://www.businessrecord.com/PrintArticle.aspx?aid=68385&
uid=718a9d24-4d05-4710-b37d-66850cc411e5 (describing Des Moines
Water Works’ struggles with extracting nutrients out of water).
123. See, e.g., Water Quality Monitoring, Iowa Department of Natural
Resources,
http://www.iowadnr.gov/Environmental-Protection/WaterQuality/Water-Monitoring/Beaches (noting that on August 5, 2016, the
Iowa Dep’t of Natural Resources marked “swimming not recommended” in
at least 15 rivers).
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to win. Many environmental conflicts may not be zerosum games according to technical game-theoretic definitions, but characterizing them in this way has traction
with the media, the public, and the parties themselves. The
zero-sum description frames our debates, often hardening
positions and limiting the range of options, both practically and conceptually. Indeed, “I win, you lose” views of
the world seem to be corroding every aspect of our public
and private lives.
Rather than tinker from within this frame, what if we
pulled back the lens and viewed natural resource conflicts
in their historical and social contexts? Owls-versus-jobs is
the snapshot. The long view would describe how federal
forest service policies subsidized unsustainable logging,
resulting in undiversified and therefore fragile economies. It would also include how efforts to undermine
labor organizing in the Pacific Northwest prevented alliances between environmentalists and loggers. Another
part of the story would acknowledge that limitations in
federal environmental laws lead to over-reliance on single
species strategies.
The longer view is harder to describe in a bumper sticker.
But excavating the historical forces that lead to particular
environmental disputes may help us move beyond pat and
unhelpful dichotomies. In the heat of the conflict, it may
feel like owls are the opposite of jobs, but reifying that feeling is neither historically accurate nor normatively attractive. Who wants to live in a world where we have to choose
between those two?
Let’s consider one of President Obama’s last acts as
Chief Executive in this context. On December 28, 2016,
President Obama designated Bears Ears National Monument pursuant to his authority under the Antiquities Act
of 1906.124 Bears Ears includes narrow canyons that wind
their way to the Colorado River, wild sandstone uplifts and
towers, and troves of ancient Puebloan ruins.
The Monument was proposed by the Bears Ears Intertribal Coalition, with support from regional and national
environmental groups. Its 1.35 million acres lie in the heart
of Utah’s dramatic redrock country, where the forces of
water and wind turn cliff walls into natural works of art.
Canyonlands and Arches National Parks lie to the north
and the eerie blue waters of Lake Powell to the south. The
human population is sparse, and reflects the different waves
of migration to this parched corner of the world—Utes,
Paiutes, Navajos, Mormons, and hippy/artist/bohemians
each lay claim to parts of the neighboring small towns.
While outsiders who visit may see little reason to
oppose greater protections for this extreme landscape,
feelings in Utah run high. Gov. Gary Herbert infelicitously described the proposal as a “political tomahawk,”
and at a public hearing staged for opponents of the Monument, said, “It is my belief that a unilateral monument
124. Presidential Proclamation: Establishment of the Bears Ears National
Monument Proclamation, Dec. 28, 2016, available at https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/28/proclamationestablishment-bears-ears-national-monument.
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designation will divide the people. It will create anger and
division. It will provoke protest and may inhibit our ability to resolve tough public land management decisions for
decades to come.”125 After the designation, members of
Governor Herbert’s political party made good on his predictions of acrimony. The Utah Legislature described the
designation as a “blatant federal land grab.”126 Sen. Orrin
Hatch (R-Utah) called it an “attack on an entire way of
life.”127 The zero-sum framings by Governor Herbert,
Senator Hatch, and others include “Preservation Versus
Democracy,” “Resource Extraction Versus Preservation,”
“Local (Non-Indian) Control Versus Outsider Influence,”
and various versions of “Jobs Versus Environment.”
One way to counter the zero-sum characterizations is to
point out that monument designation does not foreclose
many different uses of public lands. Indeed, despite misleading reports, the Proclamation recognizes preexisting
mining and grazing rights. Uses that are precluded (new
mining, drilling, and other extractive uses) will be balanced
by new economic opportunities (outdoor recreation businesses, tourism, and hospitality) for people in the region.
Further, the Monument’s final boundaries were themselves
a compromise, excluding 550,000 acres from the original
proposal in response to local Republicans’ concerns. Most
of the excluded acreage includes lands that have potential for mineral or fossil fuel extraction. These responses
are important, but the anti-Monument crowd will likely
remain convinced that they lost because preservation won.
In addition, responding solely within the zero-sum framing omits the most compelling case for the Monument’s
designation. So, let’s widen the frame.
Cedar Mesa, the uplifted plane that ascends to the Bears
Ears buttes and comprises the heart of the Monument, has
been the intermittent home to indigenous peoples of the
Southwest since at least 6500 B.C.E. Artifacts, textiles, and
rock art from each period of human occupation have left
their mark. Around every canyon bend, or so it seems, is
another cliff dwelling or petroglyph. The human population ebbed and flowed in the region until roughly 1300
C.E., when the ancient Puebloans left Cedar Mesa for the
last time until the modern era.
Fluctuating habitation makes sense in Bears Ears’ stark
landscape; it is a tough place to be on a continuous basis.
Endemic animal and plant species provide mute testament.
Consider the Great Basin spadefoot toad and the red spotted toad. They spend dry periods in states of near-suspended
animation, burrowing into the sand or under rocks. With
just enough rain to awaken them, they spring to life, filling shallow pools with a froth of tiny pink amphibians.
125. Brian Maffly, Utah Guv Calls Pro-Bear’s Ears Monument Proposal “a Political
Tomahawk,” Salt Lake Trib., July 27, 2016, available at http://www.sltrib.
com/news/4159848-155/utah-guv-calls-pro-bears-ears-monument.
126. Speaker Greg Hughes Statement About Bears Ears National Monument
Designation, Dec. 28, 2016, available at http://house.utah.gov/2016/12/28/
media-statement-speaker-greg-hughes-statement-about-bears-ears-nationalmonument-designation/.
127. Brian Maffly & Thomas Burr, Obama Declares Bears Ears National Monument
in Southern Utah, Salt Lake Trib., Dec. 28, 2016, available at http://www.
sltrib.com/home/4675012-155/mike-lee-staffer-says-bears-ears.
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Native plants, like Indian rice grass, narrow, leaf yucca,
and kachina daisies, have their own survival strategies for
high desert living. One thing they all have in common:
they make do with very little water.
The five tribal nations of the inter-tribal coalition—
Hopi, Navajo, Uintah and Ouray Ute, Ute Mountain Ute,
and Zuni—have endured far more than the climactic conditions. The five tribes, and many others (including Paiutes, Goshutes, and Pueblo peoples) at one time populated
all of southern Utah. American invasion and settlement,
accompanied by military force, nearly eliminated tribal
peoples from the southern part of the state by the late
1800s. Today, only a small strip of the Navajo Reservation
and a tiny community of Ute Mountain Utes remain in
Utah’s southeastern quarter.
And yet the tribes’ attachment to Bears Ears remains
fierce. Bears Ears is a place of origin stories. The renowned
Navajo leader, Chief Manuelito, who negotiated the Treaty
of 1868 that enabled his people to return to their homeland, was born in the shadow of the Bears Ears buttes.
Tribal members from all over come to Bears Ears to collect piñon nuts, firewood, and native plants for medicine.
Families hold ceremonies for their children, and visit the
ancient Puebloan sites that belonged to their relatives.
Elders and medicine people tend to the land. Designating
Bears Ears as a national monument, open to all but managed in consultation with the tribes, constitutes a small
gesture of reparations for tribes’ forced ejection from their
ancestral lands.
Bears Ears is reparative in another way. The Antiquities
Act of 1906 is rightly celebrated as a tool that achieved
breathtaking conservation across our public lands. Many
of our most beloved national parks started out as monuments. The Grand Canyon, Petrified Forest, Zion, Bryce,
Arches and more were first protected by the stroke of a
presidential pen. But for tribes, there is a dark side to this
history. Lands that were “preserved” from settlement or
extraction were often tribal lands. The Havasupai people of
the Grand Canyon lost their plateau lands and their way of
life to preservation policies. “Protecting” Yosemite Valley
entailed ridding it of the Miwok and Paiute people who
lived there. Similar stories, though unique in their grim
details, can be told about parks and monuments throughout the West.
The Bears Ears is the very first national monument
proposed by a coalition of tribes. Many conservation
groups supported the Bears Ears proposal, but it is, and
has been, an indigenous movement from the beginning.
President Obama’s use of the Antiquities Act to restore
tribal connections to their lands (instead of sever them)
constituted an audacious act of hope. The proclamation
designating Bears Ears provides cause, to paraphrase
Martin Luther King Jr., to believe that the arc of conservation history might bend toward justice. Despite all
of this, Bears Ears might still seem like a zero-sum game
to some. But that will not endure. In the long view, an
action that protects the land and its creatures while add-
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ing justice to the world has no losers. The world is small,
but it is bigger than that.

XIII. Juliana v. United States and Our
Zero-Sum Climate System
This section was authored by Melissa Powers, Jeffrey Bain
Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law
School.
On November 10, 2016, federal district court Judge Ann
Aiken issued an astonishing decision in the atmospheric
trust climate case, Juliana v. United States.128 The decision
holds that the plaintiffs in the case, who include children
and young adults ranging from 9 to 21 years old, have a
fundamental right “to a climate system capable of sustaining human life.”129 The decision further recognizes that the
federal government has a public trust obligation to protect
resources from the consequences of climate change, including ocean acidification and sea-level rise.130 As a result of
this decision, the plaintiffs will now be able to go to trial
to prove, among other things, “that defendants played a
significant role in creating the current climate crisis, that
defendants acted with full knowledge of the consequences
of their actions, and that defendants have failed to correct or mitigate the harms they helped create in deliberate
indifference to the injuries caused by climate change.”131
If the plaintiffs succeed at trial—as I believe they
should—the case should then proceed to the relief stage.
Plaintiffs have asked the court to order the federal government to protect the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and
to ensure protection of the trust assets by developing a
plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although resolution of the case could take years, and will almost certainly involve appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court, the Juliana decision is
already a landmark decision. In the context of this series
of essays, moreover, the Juliana decision illustrates how
and when zero-sum framing is a useful environmental
and moral device.
These essays have done an excellent job of illustrating
the ways in which zero-sum ideas have been used and misused in the arenas of conservation and environmental law.
As Jessie Owley notes above, the zero-sum concept arises
out of economic theory but has been altered in legal, and
especially political, dialogue to stand for the idea that
environmental regulations often produce an “I win, you
lose” outcome. Too often, this depiction of winners and
losers creates an untenable dichotomy pitting jobs or the
economy against the environment, which often results in
regulatory compromises that unnecessarily weaken environmental protections. As several other authors, including
128. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Civ. No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2016
WL 6661146 (D. Or. Nov. 10, 2016).
129. Id. at *15.
130. Id. at **21-22.
131. Id. at *17.
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Keith Hirokawa and John Dernbach, note, this representation of winners and losers is often false and incomplete. Indeed, economic prosperity and job growth usually
accompany environmental preservation. While there may
be situations in which a particular resource user’s goals will
be stymied by a conservation law, many environmental
laws create win-win, rather than win-lose, dynamics.
However, although environmental laws rarely create zero-sum dynamics, some environmental conditions
truly are zero-sum. As J.B. Ruhl explains, the zero-sum
economic theory refers to an economic state in which
all win-win resource allocations have been made, and
any additional transactions must benefit one person at
another’s expense. Once an economic system reaches that
zero-sum stage, it is considered to be “Pareto optimal,”
or economically efficient. Any further allocations will be
considered suboptimal, because a person can win only if
another loses. This does not mean that no further allocations should occur; it simply means that all the win-win
transactions have been exhausted.
In the case of climate change and the acceptable levels of
greenhouse concentrations in the atmosphere, we are well
past the zero-sum threshold. Current atmospheric carbon
dioxide (CO2) concentrations exceed 400 parts per million (ppm), but scientists tell us concentrations must drop
to at least 350 ppm if we are to have a chance of avoiding uncontrolled catastrophic consequences of climate
change.132 There is no way to create a win-win scenario
that would allow additional emissions of greenhouse gases,
because any new emission releases must be offset by emissions reductions from somewhere else. The science of climate change is truly zero-sum.
Strategies to address climate change, however, need
not be—or at least not in a way that pits jobs, economic
growth, and environmental protection against each other.
Indeed, a number of the essays have identified strategies
that can produce win-win outcomes with the right amount
of planning and proper design. Some of the ones identified by Jim Salzman and David Takacs attempt to change
potential zero-sum outcomes into win-win outcomes
through compensation, regulatory flexibility, or ecosystem
services models. Shalanda Baker and Inara Scott illustrate
how strategic policies designed to transition our energy system away from fossil fuels can similarly avoid the zero-sum
dynamic or at least ensure a just energy transition.
To be sure, effective climate change mitigation will
require us to abandon fossil fuels entirely, and companies
that insist upon continued exploitation of these resources
will lose out in the end. However, with the proper amount
of planning and thought, we can develop climate mitigation and adaptation strategies that will avoid creating too
many winner-versus-loser scenarios. Thus, while climate
change itself has reached a zero-sum state, climate change
policies can create far more winners than losers.
132. Reto Knutti et al., A Scientific Critique of the Two-Degree Climate Change
Target, 9 Nature Geoscience 13 (2016), available at http://www.nature.
com/ngeo/journal/v9/n1/full/ngeo2595.html.
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The Juliana litigation capitalizes on this distinction
between the science and the policies. The plaintiffs’ claims
place climate science front and center in the litigation.
In arguing for their fundamental rights and raising public trust claims, the plaintiffs have essentially asked the
court to find, based on the science, that the atmosphere
has reached a zero-sum state. A court ruling affirming the
accepted science of climate change could also help dispel
the myths underlying climate denialism. This myth-busting is particularly important now, when the new Administrator of EPA, Scott Pruitt, has openly rejected the
scientific reality of climate change. A ruling in favor of the
Juliana plaintiffs will place climate denialists on the losing
side, where they belong.
Not only would a victory in Juliana represent a significant advancement in climate law, it would alter the false
narrative that the climate system can absorb continued
increases in greenhouse gas emissions because future emissions decreases will at some point occur. For decades, the
federal government has focused on developing policies that
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aim to reduce some greenhouse gas emissions from some
sources, while authorizing massive increases of greenhouse
gases from others. Although the Obama Administration
had few alternatives to this incremental approach when
Congress refused to be a partner in addressing climate
change, the Obama Administration also supported projects that increased fossil fuel production and use. Indeed,
the Obama Administration touted its support for an “allof-the-above” energy policy that was previously embraced
by George W. Bush.
While “all-of-the-above” reflects a desire to ensure that
everyone in the energy sector continues to prosper, climate
science makes it clear that continued fossil fuel use is a loselose proposition for society at large. If the plaintiffs win the
liability phase of their litigation, they will have secured a
ruling that accepts that the climate system has reached a
zero-sum state. Once we as a society recognize this reality,
we will then be able to focus on developing nonzero-sum
strategies to move us forward.
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